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INTRODUCTION 
  
The American experiment in representative democracy is rooted in the 
fundamental concept that the people speak through the legislative branch. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that achieving the objective of “one 
person, one vote” necessarily requires that legislative districts in the various 
states be substantially equal in population and that the states must provide for 
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periodic readjustment of districts.1 The Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention 
of 1967–1968 took both this fundamental democratic principle and the directives 
provided by the United States Supreme Court and conceived the Legislative 
Reapportionment Commission.  
This Article explores the history of reapportionment in Pennsylvania, 
the concurrent formulation of the explicit standards and implicit protections of 
the Commission process, the application of those standards to the 2011–2012 
reapportionment, and in the end, why our modern founding fathers got it right.2   
 
I. REAPPORTIONMENT DEFINED 
 
Reapportionment, in this context, is the decennial process of realigning 
the 203 legislative and 50 senatorial districts in the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly to reflect changes in population.3 It is the physical manifestation of 
the democratic principle of “one person, one vote.” It is a vital part of our 
republican form of government. 
 
A. Pre-1968 Reapportionment in Pennsylvania 
 
It is important to ground any discussion of legislative apportionment in 
Pennsylvania in the appropriate historical context. From the days of the 
American Revolution, the size of the legislature and the parameters applicable 
to the drawing of districts have changed. The one constant, however, was the 
fundamental concept that reapportionment was a legislative prerogative.   
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided for a unicameral 
legislature4 and established septennial reapportionment (every seven years) 
																																								 																				
1 These concepts were recently explored by the United States Supreme Court in Evenwel v. 
Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016) (citations omitted), which stated that “jurisdictions 
must design both congressional and state-legislative districts with equal populations, and 
must regularly reapportion districts to prevent malapportionment.” 
2 During the 2011-2012 legislative reapportionment, the authors of this Article contributed 
significantly to the combined work product of the Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment 
Commission and the Amicus filing on behalf of then-Majority Leader Michael Turzai before 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. To the extent that such contributions also appear in this 
Article, citations to the Commission’s or others’ prior use of these contributions may not be 
reflected herein. 
3 While it has been offered that “redistricting” is arguably the more technically correct term, 
the Pennsylvania Constitution uses the term reapportionment. PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(a) 
(“[A] Legislative Reapportionment Commission shall be constituted for the purpose of 
reapportioning the Commonwealth.”).  
4 “The supreme legislative power shall be vested in a house of representatives of the freemen 
of the commonwealth or state of Pennsylvania.” PA. CONST. of 1776, Ch. II § 2. 
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based on the number of taxable inhabitants in Philadelphia and each county.5  
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 shifted to a bicameral legislature6 and, 
as described by Reference Manual No. 6 prepared for the 1967–1968 Pennsyl-
vania Constitutional Convention: 
 
[P]rovisions respecting representation in the lower house were 
carried over from the 1776 Constitution. . . . The requirement 
that each county should have at least one representative was 
also added; this guarantee did not apply to any county that 
might be created in the future. . . .  
. . . 
The Constitution directed the Legislature to divide the state into 
senatorial districts and permitted multi-member districts, 
although no district could elect more than four Senators. 
Neither the City of Philadelphia nor any county could be 
divided in the creation of a [Senatorial] district. . . . A 
[Senatorial] district could be composed of two or more counties 
if they were adjoining.7 
 
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838 “continued the septennial 
reapportionment and redistricting of both houses according to the number of 
taxable inhabitants,” although “[t]he provisions for Senatorial apportionment 
were changed.”8 
																																								 																				
5 “The city of Philadelphia and each county of this commonwealth respectively, shall . . . choose 
six persons to represent them in general assembly. But as representation in proportion to the 
number of taxable inhabitants is the only principle which can at all times secure liberty, and make 
the voice of a majority of the people the law of the land; therefore the general assembly shall 
cause complete lists of the taxable inhabitants in the city and each county in the commonwealth 
respectively, to be taken and returned to them on or before the last meeting of the assembly elected 
in the year one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, who shall appoint a representative to 
each, in proportion to the number of taxables in such returns; which representation shall continue 
for the next seven years afterwards at the end of which, a new return of the taxable inhabitants 
shall be made, and a representation agreeable thereto appointed by the said assembly, and so on 
septennially forever.” PA. CONST. of 1776, § 17. 
6 “The legislative power of this commonwealth shall be vested in a general assembly, which shall 
consist of a senate and house of representatives.”  PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, Ch. II § 1. 
7 PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE PA. CONSTITUTION 1967–1968, LEGISLATIVE APPOR-
TIONMENT, REF. MANUAL NO. 6, at 11–12 (1968) (footnotes omitted). See also PA. CONST. of 
1790, art. I, §§ 4, 6–7. 
8 LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, supra note 7, at 12. See also PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, §§ 4, 
6–7 (requiring an enumeration of the taxable inhabitants for apportionment of Representative and 
Senatorial members). 
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In 1857, amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution guaranteed each 
county with at least 3,500 taxable inhabitants its own representative, stated that 
no more than three counties could be joined in a legislative district, and 
prohibited the division of any county in the formation of a legislative district.9 
With respect to the Senate, the 1857 amendments allowed Philadelphia to be 
divided. While outside the City senatorial districts were composed of between 
two and four senators, the 1857 amendments limited Philadelphia to single 
senatorial districts.10 
Significant changes were made in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1873.11 These included decennial reapportionment after the United States 
census,12 use of total population rather than taxable inhabitants as the basis for 
districts,13 complex formulas to establish representation,14 and restrictions on 
representation from populous counties.15 The proscription on dividing county 
borders in the formation of House districts which had been added by amend-
ment in 1857 did not survive into the 1873 constitution.   
																																								 																				
9 PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 4 (Amendment of 1857). 
10 Id. at § 7 (Amendment of 1857). 
11 “At various times and in various publications . . . the [then] present Constitution[] has been referred 
to both as the ‘Constitution of 1873’ and/or the ‘Constitution of 1874.’ This ambiguity is explained 
by the fact that it was adopted by the Constitutional Convention in 1873, approved by the people in 
1873 to become effective January 1, 1874.” PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE PA. CONSTITUTION 
1967–1968, CONSTITUTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA, REF. MANUAL NO. 2, at 9, n.1 (1968). 
12 “The General Assembly at its first session after the adoption of this Constitution, and 
immediately after each United States decennial census, shall apportion the State into 
senatorial and representative districts agreeably to the provisions of the two next preceding 
sections [of the Constitution].” PA. CONST. of 1873, art. II, § 18. 
13 Id. at art. II, §§ 16–17 (using state population to determine representative and senatorial districts). 
14 “The members of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
counties, on a ratio obtained by dividing the population of the State as ascertained by the most 
recent United States census by two hundred. Every county containing less than five ratios shall 
have one representative for every full ratio, and an additional representative when the surplus 
exceeds half a ratio; but each county shall have at least one representative.  Every county 
containing five ratios or more shall have one representative for every full ratio.  Every city 
containing a population equal to a ratio shall elect separately its proportion of the representatives 
allotted to the county in which it is located.  Every city entitled to more than four representatives, 
and every county having over one hundred thousand inhabitants shall be divided into districts of 
compact and contiguous territory, each district to elect its proportion of representatives according 
to its population, but no district shall elect more than four representatives.” Id. at art. II, § 17.  See 
id. at art. II, § 16 for the formula for Senatorial districts. 
15 PA. CONST. of 1873, art. II, § 16 (limiting senatorial apportionment to no greater than one sixth 
of the whole number of senators). See also LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, supra note 7, at 12 
(describing how the 1873 Constitution changed Philadelphia’s apportionment by “prohibiting any 
city or county from having more than one-sixth of the total number of Senators”). 
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As will be further discussed below, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
often failed to meet the requirement for decennial reapportionment.16  
 
B. State and Federal Jurisprudence in the 1960s 
 
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court stepped into the swirling 
waters of reapportionment. The case law began with Baker v. Carr, in which 
the United States Supreme Court held that equal protection claims challenging 
state reapportionment statutes are justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution.17    
Shortly after its opinion in Baker v. Carr, the United State Supreme 
Court heard a dispute in which a Georgia redistricting plan “employed a system 
which in end result weighted rural votes more heavily than urban votes and 
weighted some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties.”18 
In announcing the United States Supreme Court’s 1963 decision, Justice 
Douglas declared “[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration 
of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one 
person, one vote.”19  
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that congressional 
districts must be redrawn so that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in 
a congressional election is . . . worth as much as another’s.”20 In that same year, 
in its landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the boundaries of state legislative districts must be redrawn and that 
the “overriding objective must be substantial equality of population 
among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately 
																																								 																				
16 “The blunt fact is that past General Assemblies of Pennsylvania have been derelict in the duty 
specifically imposed on them by the Constitution of Pennsylvania in failing to pass 
reapportionment acts as required by the express mandate of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” 
Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 710 (E.D. Pa. 1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 916 (1952). 
See also Costello v. Rice, 153 A.2d 888, 892 (Pa. 1959) (explaining that “[w]hether the legislature 
should be disciplined for dereliction in the discharge of the duty laid upon it by Article II, Section 
18, of the Constitution, to apportion the State decennially into senatorial and legislative districts, 
presents a political and not a justiciable question . . . .”); Butcher v. Rice, 153 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 
1959) (Bell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (noting “that the last Senatorial Reapportionment 
was by Act of May 10, 1921, and that the last Reapportionment for the House of Representatives 
was made . . . by Act of July 29, 1953”). 
17 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
18 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 368 (1963). 
19 Id. at 381.  
20 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
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equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.”21 The Reynolds Court 
explained: “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are 
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”22  
During this period in our nation’s history, many state supreme courts 
were beginning their own foray into these same waters. Pennsylvania was no 
exception. In March 1962, the General Assembly had not yet reapportioned the 
Pennsylvania House and Senate under the 1960 decennial census. The House 
had been reapportioned following the 1950 decennial census.23 However, the 
Senate had not been reapportioned since 1921.24 In Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher 
I), a group of voters from the southeast brought an action in equity in the 
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas to prevent the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth from holding legislative elections using the reapportionment 
enacted ten and forty years earlier.25 In its decision–issued prior to Baker v. 
Carr and Gray v. Sanders–the lower court found that the issues were 
justiciable, but “refused to adjudicate them until the Legislature had an 
opportunity to enact appropriate legislation at its forthcoming sessions.”26 The 
county court retained jurisdiction of the matter.27 
The General Assembly responded with the passage of reapportionment 
bills for the House and the Senate, and the bills were approved by the Governor 
on January 9, 1964, becoming Acts 1 and 2 of that year.28 Immediately 
thereafter, the Butcher plaintiffs petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
take jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Special Writ of 
Certiorari and held that the House and Senate reapportionment bills enacted in 
1964 were unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court’s 
																																								 																				
21 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court further 
explained, “We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a 
population basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state legislators is 
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared 
with votes of citizens living on other parts of the State.” Id. at 568. 
22 Id. at 562 (emphasis added). 
23 Act No. 232, 1953 Pa. Laws 956 (fixing and apportioning the number of representatives). 
24 Act No. 217, 1921 Pa. Laws 449. “The lower Court found, and all parties agree that the last 
Senatorial Reapportionment was by Act of May 10, 1921, and that the last Reapportionment for 
the House of Representatives was made on the basis of the United States decennial census of 1950 
by Act of July 29, 1953.” Butcher v. Rice, 153 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 1959) (Bell, J., dissenting). 
25 Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher I), 203 A.2d 556, 558 (Pa. 1964) (footnote omitted). 
26 Id. (summarizing the disposition of the lower court ruling). 
27 Id. 
28 Act No. 1, 1963 Pa. Laws 1419 (fixing the number of representatives in the General Assembly 
and apportioning the representatives into districts); Act No. 2, 1963 Pa. Laws 1432 (fixing the 
number of senators in the General Assembly and apportioning the senators into districts). 
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decision in Reynolds v. Sims.29 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that 
the legislative elections should nonetheless be held using the districts as 
recently enacted; and, the General Assembly should reapportion the House and 
Senate for the 1966 elections in a way that would not violate the mandate of 
“one-person, one-vote” enunciated in Reynolds.30 The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court issued a deadline for the General Assembly to pass new plans by 
September 1, 1965.31 The General Assembly was unable to produce new 
districts by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s deadline.32   
In February 1966, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set about drawing new 
districts with the recently enunciated standards provided by the United States 
Supreme Court in the line of cases that included Baker, Reynolds33 and Westberry.   
In Butcher II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed thirty proposed 
plans to reapportion the House and Senate.34 But, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court ultimately opted for its own plan, which it viewed as “constitutionally 
valid and sound.”35 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court identified “substantial 
equality of population among legislative districts” as the primary concern in 
redistricting.36 Simultaneously, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “sought to 
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions and to create compact districts of 
contiguous territory, insofar as these goals could be realized under the circum-
stances of the population distribution of this Commonwealth.”37  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that the House and Senate 
Plans adopted in Butcher II be used in the 1966 primary and general elections.38 
All 203 seats in the House of Representatives and all 50 seats in the Senate 
would be filled in a single election. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered 
																																								 																				
29 Butcher I, 203 A.2d at 567. 
30 Id. at 568-69. 
31 Id. at 573. 
32 Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher II), 216 A.2d 457, 459 (Pa. 1966). 
33 In its most recent term, the United States Supreme Court referenced Reynolds when it 
clarified that partisan-gerrymandering Equal Protection claims are “‘individual and personal 
in nature,’” and thus only plaintiffs that feel the vote dilution as an individual in their district, 
rather than on a statewide basis, have standing to sue. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1920 
(2018) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561 (1964)). See also Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S.Ct. 
1942, 1944 (2018) (holding that a delay of “six years, and three general elections” before 
seeking a preliminary injunction does not make a showing of irreparable harm). While Gill 
and Benisek are included here to provide the current state of the law regarding partisan 
gerrymandering claims, they are of no moment to the subject matter of this article. 
34 Butcher II, 216 A.2d at 457. 
35 Id. at 459. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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that “senators representing odd numbered senatorial districts shall be elected 
to serve a two year term and senators representing even number (sic) senatorial 
districts shall be elected to serve for a constitutional four year term.”39   
These court decisions set the stage for major changes in how 
Pennsylvania determined new legislative and senatorial districts as well as the 
guideposts for drawing those district lines. These changes would occur at 
Pennsylvania’s 1967–1968 Constitutional Convention. 
 
C. 1967–1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention 
 
The two current sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution that govern 
reapportionment of state legislative and senatorial districts were a product of the 
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, which took place in 1967 and 1968. 
Article II, Section 16,40 provides express standards for the redrawing of district 
lines. Article II, Section 17,41 contains numerous procedural requirements as 
well as additional standards implicit in the nonpartisan political mechanism that 
was adopted.42 Endorsed by the people of Pennsylvania at the ballot box on April 
23, 1968, the development of these two interrelated sections at the convention is 
further explored in parts II and III below.   
 
II. THE EXPLICIT REAPPORTIONMENT STANDARDS IN ARTICLE II § 16  
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 
 
A. Equality of Population 
 
 Article II, § 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution specifically provides that, 
when reapportioning the Commonwealth, it “shall be divided into 50 senatorial 
and 203 representative districts . . . as nearly equal in population as practicable.”43 
																																								 																				
39 Id.  
40  The Commonwealth’s legislative districts are divided “into 50 senatorial and 203 represent-
ative districts, which shall be composed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in 
population as practicable. Each senatorial district shall elect one Senator, and each representative 
district one Representative. Unless absolutely necessary no county, city, incorporated town, 
borough, township or ward shall be divided in forming either a senatorial or representative 
district.” PA. CONST. art II, § 16. 
41 PA. CONST. art II, § 17 (outlining the composition of a Legislative Reapportionment 
Commission, providing a cause of action for aggrieved persons, and setting the timeline for a 
reapportionment plan, inter alia). 
42 Since the convention, Section 17 has been amended to clarify the timeline in relation to the 
decennial census (in 1981) and to provide for a new election in any senatorial district that is moved 
mid-term so that it no longer contains the residence of the sitting Senator (in 2001). PA. CONST., 
art. II, § 17 (amended 1981, 2001). Neither change is particularly relevant to this discussion.  
43 PA. CONST. art II, § 16.  
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 Population equality has to be the lodestar of reapportionment. If not for 
the overriding need for population equality and resulting equality of repre-
sentation in the General Assembly, there would be no obligation to go through 
the effort and the Commonwealth could have continued operating under 
Article II, § 17 of the Constitution of 1873.44 
 In contrast to the current approach, the 1873 language had established a 
ratio system which guaranteed each county at least one representative. As noted 
by Delegate Michael in her remarks at Pennsylvania’s most recent Constitutional 
Convention, “Back in 1964, before the Supreme Court ruled the one-man one-
vote apportionment,” the House District from Forest County had approximately 
4,500 people.45 This contrasted with 80,000 people in other districts.46   
 As noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1972, 1981, 1992 and 
2002, the controlling consideration in the apportionment of legislative seats is 
substantial equality of population, that is, districts “as nearly equal in population 
as practicable.”47 Regardless of the admonition in the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s 2012 opinion that the “overriding objective” of equality of population 
“does not require that reapportionment plans pursue the narrowest possible 
deviation,”48 population equality was, is, and must continue to be the raison 
d’etre of reapportionment. 
 
B. Compactness and Contiguity 
 
Section 16 also requires that districts “shall be composed of compact and 
contiguous territory.”49  In Specter (concerning the 1971 reapportionment), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there is a certain degree of unavoidable 
																																								 																				
44 PA. CONST. of 1873, art. II, § 17. 
45 Statement of Del. Michael, in 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 457 (1968). Del. Mildred Michael (R) from York County 
taught speech debate and English at the University of Pittsburgh. Section 5 Constitutional 
Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 12 (1968). 
46 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra 
note 45, at 457 (remarks of Del. Fagan) (noting that there were “nearly 80,000 voters for each 
Representative in Clearfield, Armstrong, Centre, Dauphin and Indiana Counties”). 
47Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 989, 993 (Pa. 2002); In re 1991 
Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 609 A.2d 132, 136–37 (Pa. 1992); In re Reappor-
tionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 665 (Pa. 1981); Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 
15, 18 (Pa. 1972). But see Holt v. 2011 Legis. Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 759 
(Pa. 2012) (“Contrary to the suggestion of the Court in In re 1991 Plan, Article II, Section 16 by its 
terms does not ‘require that the overriding objective of reapportionment is equality of population.’”).   
48 Holt I, 38 A.3d at 760. 
49 PA. CONST., art. II, § 16. 
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non-compactness in any apportionment scheme because: (1) the population 
density of the state is quite uneven, so attempts to achieve the overriding 
objective of substantial equality of population will usually require the drawing 
of districts that are not models of geometric compactness; and (2) attempts to 
maintain the integrity of the boundaries of political subdivisions will add another 
increment of unavoidable non-compactness, since a great many subdivisions in 
the Commonwealth have a geographic shape which falls far short of ideal 
mathematical compactness.50 
To comply with the requirement of contiguity, a person must be able to 
go from any point within the district to any other point within the district 
without leaving the district.51  
 
C. Integrity of Political Subdivisions 
	
Finally, Article II, Section 16 goes on to explain that, “[u]nless 
absolutely necessary no county, city, incorporated town, borough, township or 
ward shall be divided in forming either a senatorial or representative district.”52 
It is interesting to note that these boundary lines were not held out for special 
consideration in the creation of House districts in the 1873 Constitution.53     
These explicit standards, however, do not exist in a vacuum. They 
operate in tandem with other considerations inherent in the Commission process. 
 
III. THE PROTECTION IS IN THE PROCESS: ARTICLE II § 17  
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 
  
 Reapportionment of the Commonwealth’s House and Senate districts, 
while not traditionally “legislative” in the sense that it requires a bill passed by 
both chambers and signed by the Governor, is nevertheless a legislative process. 
Failure to appreciate the value of legislative input, and its recognition of 
communities and constituency groups across the Commonwealth, is the fatal 
conceit of those who would draw maps simply as an abstract mathematical 
exercise. These communities and constituency groups are commonly referred to 
in reapportionment parlance as communities of interest. Communities of 
interest54 include “[s]ocial, cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic interests 
																																								 																				
50 Specter, 293 A.2d at 18–19. 
51 Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 
52 PA. CONST. art. II, § 16. 
53 Pennsylvania’s 1873 Constitution prohibited division of wards, boroughs or townships for 
Senate districts but not House Districts. See PA. CONST. of 1873 art. II, §§ 16–17. 
54 The National Conference of State Legislatures has noted that preservation of communities 
of interest is among the generally recognized principles of redistricting. NAT’L CONFERENCE 
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common to the population of the area” and may be reflected in the cores of 
existing districts.55     
 Any review of Pennsylvania’s reapportionment plans has generally 
focused on the explicit constitutional standards found in Article II, § 16 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.56 Equally important are the implicit political ques-
tions which are an inherent part of the process of reapportionment established in 
Article II, § 17. The drafters of Section 17 had these implicit, nonpartisan 
political considerations in mind when they determined the composition of the 
Commission would include the majority and minority leaders of both chambers 
of the General Assembly. Commission consideration and preservation of comm-
unities of interest ensures that implicit communities are not destroyed by explicit, 
but invisible and sometimes outdated, municipal boundaries. 
 Any system of reapportionment must find a way to take all of the 
influences and interests, from those focused on limited, provincial concerns to 
those of statewide significance, and harness them to positive effect. In other 
words, the protection is, and has to be, in the process.   
 
A. Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention 
 
 The delegates to the 1967–1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Con-
vention understood the relationship between the two constitutional provisions. 
The Convention considered two proposals related to reapportionment: 
 
• Proposal No. 1 (which would form the basis for Article II, § 16 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution) concerned the number of senatorial and 
legislative districts as well as the explicit standards for creating those 
districts.57 
• Proposal No. 2 (which would form the basis for Article II, § 17 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution) concerned the creation of the Legislative 
Reapportionment Commission.58 
																																								 																				
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Law 2010, at 105–06 (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
Portals/1/Documents/Redistricting/Redistricting_2010.pdf. 
55 Id. at 106, 184 (discussing these same concepts generally). See also Justin Levitt,  A Citizen’s 
Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 56 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/analysis/a-citizens-guide-to-redistricting.pdf (explaining that many consider 
communities of interest to serve one of the main purposes of redistricting: grouping together 
people with shared interests and priorities).  
56 See supra text accompanying note 40 for the text of PA. CONST. art. II, § 16.   
57 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 385 
(Jan. 22, 1968). 
58 Id.  at 417-18. 
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 While Proposal No. 1 was generally regarded as more substantive and 
Proposal No. 2 generally regarded as more procedural, both contained elements 
of the other and formed a cogent whole.  One did not, and does not, make sense 
without the other.59 
 This inherent connection even influenced the process whereby the 
proposals were considered. On January 25, 1968, the delegates to the convention 
overwhelmingly approved a motion to postpone further consideration of 
Proposal No. 1 until Proposal No. 2 could be considered. The motion to postpone 
was defined as follows: 
 
[U]ntil such time as a Proposal on Method of Apportionment 
still in the Committee on Legislative Apportionment has been 
reported out of that Committee and has been placed in the same 
reading position on the calendar as that of Proposal No. 1.60 
 
 On February 7, 1968, Delegate Fagan offered the reasoning of the 
committees61 behind Proposal No. 2 (Article II, § 17). As a starting point, he 
explained that the legislature was “the appropriate group to make this change 
[reapportionment] . . .  because of the fact that they are more conversant with 
the State and also the legislative and senatorial districts and the method in 
which it should be divided in the best interests of the citizens of 
Pennsylvania.”62 The delegates who served on the Committee on Legislative 
Apportionment understood that the nature of the legislature and its elected 
officials was such that legislators knew about the communities of interest 
within the Commonwealth as well as the particular legislative district lines 
which would best represent those interests.   
 However, the entire legislature, in the past, had trouble reaching 
agreement on a final reapportionment map. Delegate Fagan stated, “because of 
the fact that in past considerations by this body [the legislature] they have been 
																																								 																				
59 See also Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 528 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted) (holding where 
two provisions of the State Constitution relate to the same subject matter, they are to be read in 
pari materia). 
60 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra 
note 45, at 398 (remarks of Del. Fagan). As the co-chair of the Committee on Legislative 
Apportionment, id. at 81, Delegate Fagan was particularly suited to speak on these matters. 
Delegate Thomas Fagan (D) was President of Teamsters Union Local 249 in Allegheny 
County. Section 5 Constitutional Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in id. at 6. 
61 Delgate Fagan referred to this group as “the Committee on Method of Apportionment and the 
Standing Committee on Legislative Apportionment.” DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra note 45, at 525. Later in the day, Delegate 
Baldridge referred to it as the “Subcommittee on Method of Reapportionment.” Id. at 533. 
62 Id. at supra note 60 at 525. 
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unable to conclude an agreement among themselves . . . the duty was passed 
on to the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court.”63 This problem was the impetus 
for the creation of a Legislative Reapportionment Commission. 
 Proposal No. 2 offered a hybrid, intended to take the unique and 
important perspective of the legislature and create a smaller body which could 
more expeditiously act within the reapportionment timelines.   
 
Under this proposal it establishes a commission. The comm-
ission is composed of members of both the House of 
Representatives and the leaders in the Senate . . . .  
  . . . . 
 [W]e feel that by giving it to this commission that they can 
come up with the proper decisions of reapportionment that are 
in the best interest of all the citizens of Pennsylvania . . . .   
  . . . .  
We feel that after giving consideration to all the proposals, to 
all those who appeared at our public hearings that this concept 
we have in this proposal sets forth the best ideas and principles 
and will serve the best interests of the citizens of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania.64   
 
In response to an amendment,65 Delegate Baldridge explained that “there are 
no people in Pennsylvania who know the legislative or senatorial districts 
better than the members” of the House and Senate.66 In that same exchange, 
Delegate Goldman67 continued: 
 
I do not believe this plan denies the legislators, the Assembly, 
the right to reapportion themselves.  The only thing this plan 
does is establish who will speak in behalf of these bodies, rather 
than have the bodies speak for themselves in toto. I believe the 
																																								 																				
63 Id.   
64 Id. at 525–26.   
65 Delegate Baldridge was responding to the Powell amendment, which failed by a vote of 
49 yeas to 86 nays and 28 not voting. Id. at 538–39. Delegate Jerry Powell (R) was a director 
at Electronic Data Processing in Bucks County. Section 5 Constitutional Convention 
Delegates and Executive Staff, in DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra note 45, at 15. 
66 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra 
note 45, at 533. Delegate Robert Baldridge (R) was a lawyer and farmer in Indiana County.  
Section 5 Constitutional Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in id. at 1. 
67 Delegate Harold Goldman (R) was an attorney in Allegheny County.  Id. at 8. 
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sessions that we have had in the past several years have clearly 
indicated that when given such a politically oriented and base 
issue as apportionment, the legislature will undoubtedly 
become tied up and impossibly deadlocked in this vital task.   
 
I suggest that . . . the basic proposal, Proposal No. 2, be 
accepted . . . .68   
 
Later in the day, Delegate Croop69 offered, 
  
It was not with any disrespect [to the legislature] that we 
narrowed it down to the two leaders in the House and the two 
leaders in the Senate . . . . We merely narrowed it down to save 
work. We knew that they would speak for their constituents in 
each branch of the government. . . .  
. . . . 
[T]he legislature does have the knowledge and the know-how 
and it was merely that we were narrowing it down.70   
   
 Our modern-day founding fathers understood the need to protect 
communities even if their geographical reach crossed subdivision borders. The 
Commission process ensures that, when reapportionment occurs, a myopic 
focus on boundary lines does not lose the forest for the trees. 
 
B. Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
 
 Time and again, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized 
reapportionment both as a legislative prerogative and as a means of preserving 
interests which may not be readily apparent from reading a map or computer 
printout. Before the creation of the first Commission, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court explained that “[t]he task of reapportionment is not only the 
responsibility of the Legislature, it is also a function which can be best 
accomplished by that elected branch of government.”71   
																																								 																				
68 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra 
note 45, at 536.  
69 Delegate Frank Croop (R) was an insurance agent and broker in Columbia County.  Section 
5 Constitutional Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in id. at 5. 
70 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra 
note 45, at 541.   
71 Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher I), 203 A.2d 556, 569 (Pa. 1964). 
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 The unique advantages of the Commission, as a legislative process, 
were noted in the first Pennsylvania Supreme Court case considering the work 
of a Legislative Reapportionment Commission. In Commonwealth ex rel. 
Specter v. Levin, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered the following 
description of the new method: 
 
Prior to 1968 reapportionment of the Pennsylvania Legislature 
was effected by act of the General Assembly. . . .  
. . . . 
The advantages of assignment (sic) the responsibility for 
reapportioning the Legislature to such a commission are quite 
obvious, and several other states have recently adopted or 
considered proposals for similar commissions.  The equal 
representation on the Commission provided to the majority and 
minority members of each house precludes the reapportionment 
process from being unfairly dominated by the party in power at 
the moment of apportionment. In addition, the provision for a 
chairman who can act as a “tie-breaker” eliminates the 
possibility of a legislative deadlock on reapportionment such as 
the one that occurred in the Legislature of this Commonwealth 
in 1965 and compelled this Court to undertake the task of 
reapportionment. At the same time the Legislature’s expertise 
in reapportionment matters is essentially retained.72   
 
In 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: 
 
The principle that reapportionment is a legislative function is 
evident from the plain language of this state’s Constitution. 
Article II, Section 17(d) directs not only that the Legislative 
Reapportionment Commission file a reapportionment plan but 
also that, in the event a final plan is determined by this Court to 
be invalid, the plan be remanded to the Commission for a 
second attempt at reapportionment.73   
 
In 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Albert v. 2001 
Legislative Reapportionment Commission reiterated the same themes which 
influenced the Convention: 
 
																																								 																				
72 Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 17, 17–18 (Pa. 1972) (footnotes omitted).  
73 In re Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 665 (Pa. 1981). 
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The legislative process envisioned by the Pennsylvania 
Constitution is particularly suited to the considerations of 
community interests that appellants claimed were overlooked. 
See Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556, 569 (1964) 
(“The composition of the Legislature, the knowledge which its 
members from every part of the state bring to its deliberations, 
its techniques for gathering information, and other factors 
inherent in the legislative process, make it the most appropriate 
body for the drawing of lines dividing the state into senatorial 
and representative districts.”).74   
            
 In fact, the Albert court went so far regarding the Commission’s 
invaluable expertise on these points as to discount claims by appellants based 
on the same concepts.75  
 In Holt I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: “It is true, of course, 
that redistricting has an inevitably legislative, and therefore an inevitably 
political, element . . . .”76  
 Quoting the Holt I opinion and hearkening back to even earlier 
precedent, the Holt II court noted that the constitution “vests discretion in the 
judgment of the commissioner members, and it does so with a deliberate scheme 
where four of the five commissioners are the party leaders so as to, inter alia, 
‘essentially retain[]’  ‘the Legislature’s expertise in reapportionment matters.’”77 
 The Holt I court juxtaposed this “political” element with a discussion 
of the conceptual appeal of a homogenous district “in order to facilitate the 
functioning of a representative form of government” as discussed in the brief 
of a pro se appellant.78 The reality, however, is that this “political” element 
often serves to foster homogeneity and communities of interest in circum-
stances where the municipal lines may not further those purposes. 
 The Holt I court cited with approval a discussion of communities of 
interest by Dean Gormley. While Gormley offers some words of caution against 
the misuse of the “communities of interest” label, he also recognizes it as a useful 
and legitimate redistricting tool. He states that “[t]he fundamental districting 
principles that the [U.S. Supreme] Court has deemed legitimate over the years 
include, but are not limited to, ‘compactness, contiguity, and respect for political 
																																								 																				
74 Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 989, 999–1000 (Pa. 2002). 
75 See id. at 999.  
76 Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 745 (Pa. 2012). 
77 Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt II), 67 A.3d 1211, 1240 (Pa. 
2013) (quoting Holt I, 38 A.3d at 745). 
78 Holt I, 38 A.3d at 745 (citation omitted). 
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subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests . . . .’”79 As 
one of the more extensive uses of quoted material in the Holt I opinion, the 
Gormley explanation continued: 
  
Historically, reapportionment bodies have considered “comm-
unities of interest” as one legitimate factor in drawing fair and 
politically sensitive districts. A redistricting body need not draw 
rigid squares of equal population; in fact, few states do so. 
Rather, redistricting bodies traditionally take into account a host 
of intangible communities, seeking to give them, where practi-
cable, a voice in the government without unduly fracturing that 
voice. Thus, school districts, religious communities, ethnic 
communities, geographic communities which share common 
bonds due to locations of rivers, mountains and highways, and a 
host of other “communities of interest” are routinely considered 
by districting bodies in order to construct fair and effective maps. 
Shared racial background, along with political affiliation, ethnic 
identity, religious affiliation, occupational background, all can 
converge to create bona fide communities of interest, to the 
extent that the redistricting body makes an honest effort to draw 
lines around geographically compact groups in order to give 
them a voice in the governmental process.  
 
. . . At the same time, states have historically considered a broad 
range of such imprecise communities of interest (many of which 
are naturally intertwined) in exercising their sound discretion. 
They do so to satisfy constituents. They do so to sweep together 
a host of generally identifiable interest groups that wish to be 
given a unified voice. This is perfectly healthy and permissible. 
It is an important aspect of the state’s prerogative, when it comes 
to structuring its own form of government. 80  
 
 Addressing the concept of communities of interest in Holt II, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court again quoted extensively from Dean Gormley 
and provided this observation: “[W]e do not discount that redistricting efforts 
																																								 																				
79 Id. at 745–46 (emphasis added) (quoting Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and 
Reapportionment: When Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 735, 779–81 (2002)). 
80 Id. at 746 (quoting Gormley, supra note 79, at 779–81 (2002)). 
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may properly seek to preserve communities of interest which may not dovetail 
precisely with the static lines of political subdivisions.”81 
 Pennsylvania courts have recognized communities of interest as a 
legitimate consideration in reapportionment, and further, have recognized the 
legislature’s role in identifying those communities. The communities of 
interest contemplated by prior reapportionment efforts are reflected in the 
continuation of the cores of many legislative districts, whether as “historically 
unified subdivisions” or historically unified ethnic or religious neighborhoods 
which straddle the unseen civic borders separating neighbor from neighbor.82 
 
C. Explicit Municipalities and Implicit Communities 
 
 Communities of interest are often the building block of neighborhoods. 
Certain communities enjoy specific protection under federal law in spite of any 
municipal boundaries which might divide them. For example, Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973) offers protection for communities 
defined by race, color or minority language status.83 As explained in the 
context of the Voting Rights Act, the geographic compactness of a 
“community” is not limited by municipal boundaries. Shared values, interests 
and other important connections, rather than municipalities, are the focus.  
 A municipality is a political construct which may, or may not, accur-
ately reflect the communities of interest within it. It can be argued that the 
larger the municipality, the more divergent the interests. Even within 
municipalities of relatively small population, however, there may be interests 
which more closely align with neighbors just across a township border than 
																																								 																				
81 Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1241. This contrasts sharply with the Holt II court’s rejection of Commission 
arguments which were based on respect for the democratic process found in recognition of 
continuity of representation and the cores of existing districts. Id. at 1234-37. 
82 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in League of Women Voters of Pennsy-
lvania casts aspersions on Holt II’s respect for communities of interest. See League of Women 
Voters of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737, 775 (Pa. 2018). There, the Court held that 
the 2011 congressional redistricting plan violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Free and Equal 
Elections Clause by drawing districts that did not properly weigh criteria like equal population, 
compactness and contiguousness against protecting communities of interest. Id. at 790–800, 818.  
The practical import of the case is to read the traditional districting criteria laid out expressly for 
only state apportionment in the Pennsylvania Constitution into Commonwealth constitutional 
jurisprudence regarding congressional redistricting. Compare League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d 
at 818 (requiring “equally populous, compact, and contiguous districts which divide political 
subdivisions only as necessary to ensure equal population”), with PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (stating 
that each district “shall be composed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in 
population as practicable”). Still, League is of limited prospective value in the state redistricting 
context because it concerns congressional redistricting and provides little in the way of actual 
guidance to legislative map-drawers. 
83 Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). 
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with those located miles away but still within the far-flung geographic reach of 
the municipal boundary. 
 The consideration of municipal borders is important, as noted by its 
inclusion in the explicit standards of Article II, § 16. The consideration of 
communities of interest, often as reflected in existing districts, deserves 
acknowledgment as an implicit and integral part of the process under § 17. 
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may take issue with this notion, 
consideration of communities of interest does not appear in § 16’s enumerated 
list precisely because it is inherent in the process of § 17. They are two halves 
which make a whole in the same manner that Sections 16 and 17 work together 
to provide a complete framework for drawing new legislative districts every 
ten years. The process protects the interests of the people.  
 
D. The Importance of the Chair 
	
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides a process by which the four 
legislative members of the Commission select the fifth member who “shall 
serve as chairman of the commission.”84 If the legislative members are unable 
to agree on a fifth member, “a majority of the entire membership of the 
Supreme Court . . . shall appoint the chairman.”85  During the 1967–68 
Constitutional Convention, the delegates appeared to recognize how important 
the fifth member of the Commission would be to the process. In defense of the 
proposal, Delegate Prendergast86 argued: 
 
Under this plan we have the majority leader and minority leader 
in both Houses, plus the fifth member to be selected by them. I 
cannot believe that they will not get together and select a fifth 
member as chairman—a nonpolitical person—within 45 days. 
If necessary, of course, it does go to the Supreme Court and this 
is a check-and-balance sort of thing.87 
 
Delegate Croop argued in favor of the Commission process and stated, 
“[w]e thought they stood a better chance—with their fifth man as a chair-
																																								 																				
84 PA. CONST. art II, § 17(b). 
85 Id. 
86  Delegate James Prendergast (D) from Northampton County served in the Pennsylvania 
House of Representatives from 1959 to 1978. See James F. Prendergast, PA. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/BiosHistory/MemBio.cfm?ID 
=657&body=H [https://perma.cc/PFB7-SPYH] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
87 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra 
note 45, at 535 (1968) (emphasis added). 
Vol. 4:3]      The Protection is in the Process 
	
	
373 
man—of reaching a conclusion than to put the entire body up.”88 And, as earlier 
stated in this Article, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the importance 
of the chair in Specter as follows: “[T]he provision for a chairman who can act as 
a ‘tie-breaker’ eliminates the possibility of a legislative dead-lock on reappor-
tionment such as the one that occurred in the Legislature of this Commonwealth 
in 1965 and compelled this Court to undertake the task of reapportionment.”89 
Over the course of the Pennsylvania Reapportionment Commission’s 
50-year history, there have been five distinguished individuals who have filled 
the role of Commission Chair.90 Each of them accomplished attorneys in their 
own right, two of whom were well-regarded jurists and two others skilled 
academicians from one of Pennsylvania’s most prestigious law schools. One 
was appointed by the legislative members of the Commission. In the other four 
instances, the Chair was appointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
Regardless of the means of appointment, though, the Chair fills a vital 
role on the Commission. The Chair is more than a tie-breaking vote. In practice, 
the Chair is the arbiter of disputes; the director of all Commission-related 
traffic (such as meeting schedules between the leaders of the two chambers of 
the General Assembly, as well as when and where Commission hearings take 
place); and, the moderator of partisan ambition.  
Critics of Pennsylvania’s commission process argue that it benefits the 
party that holds the Majority in the House and Senate. However, the Specter 
Court (above) correctly pointed out that the two Majority and two Minority 
leaders are on exactly equal footing during the commission process.91 The 
legislative commission members bring an expertise in such things as 
geography and communities of interest to the redistricting process. The Chair, 
																																								 																				
88 Id. at 540–41 (emphasis added). 
89 Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. 1972).  
90 The 1971 Commission Chair, selected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was Professor A. 
Leo Levin of the Pennsylvania University School of Law. In 1981, the Commission selected 
Pennsylvania University School of Law Dean James O. Freedman. In 1991, after the Comm-
ission’s selection for Chair, Pittsburgh University Dean Robert Nordenburg, was subsequently 
appointed to a position with the administration, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court selected former 
United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania Robert J. Cindrich. In 2001, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court appointed retired Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Frank J. 
Montemuro, Jr.  Finally, in 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appointed retired Penn-
sylvania Superior Court President Judge Emeritus Stephen J. McEwen, Jr. See Legislative 
Reapportionment Commission to Hold First Public Meeting on March 23, PA. REDISTRICTING 
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Press/ViewArticle.cfm?ID=1006 [https:// 
perma.cc/4GAU-F72G] (summarizing the prior Commission chairs). 
91 Specter, 293 A.2d at 17 (“The equal representation on the Commission provided to the 
majority and minority members of each house precludes the reapportionment process from 
being unfairly dominated by the party in power at the moment of apportionment.”). 
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who must be devoid of parochial partisan agendas of his or her own, assists the 
leaders in navigating the journey. 
   
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT’S 2012 “RECALIBRATION” 
 
It is worthwhile to provide some background regarding how the state 
legislative reapportionment process occurred in the wake of the 2010 Census.92 
For those unfamiliar with the specifics, the first reapportionment plan (2011 
Final Plan, including both the House and Senate Plans), was remanded by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court as “contrary to law.”93 The basis for the remand 
was primarily focused on the integrity of political subdivisions in the 2011 
Final Plan.94 
Some commentators who participated in the 2011–2012 reapportion-
ment process consistently exalted municipal or other boundaries over 
population equality.95 This seems to miss the point of reapportionment. People 
(equality of representation) are more important than dotted lines on a map.  
 
A. The 2011 Final Plan Was Better Than Its Predecessor 
 
 The 2011 Final Plan remanded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
was constitutionally sound based on 40 years of Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
precedent. The 2011 Final Plan was better than the 2001 Final Plan which had 
																																								 																				
92 An abbreviated timeline of notable events: 
• December 12, 2011 - The Legislative Reapportionment Commission filed the 2011 
Final Plan. 
• January 25, 2012 – After challenges were filed and heard, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court issued a per curiam order declaring the 2011 Final Plan “contrary to law” and 
remanding the matter back to the Commission. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
opinion was released on February 3, 2012. 
• June 8, 2012 – The Commission adopted the 2012 Final Plan. 
• May 8, 2013 – After challenges were filed and heard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
upheld the 2012 Final Plan. 
A more extensive timeline is available at Legislative Reapportionment Commission Meetings 
and Updates, PA. REDISTRICTING, http://www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Commission/Commis 
sion.cfm [https://perma.cc/S2DM-82K6] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).  
93 Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 756 (Pa. 2012). 
94 Id. at 756–57 (discussing the unnecessary subdivision splits made by the 2011 Final Plan). 
95 See Public Hearing of the Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, Volume XIII (May 2, 
2012) (see testimony of Representative Greg Vitali, at 547-551, Mayor Leo Scoda, at 568-
571, Mayor Carolyn Comitta, at 571-575, and Amanda Holt, at 580-587) (copy of transcript 
on file with author); Public Hearing of the Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, Volume 
XIV, at 666-670 (May 7, 2012) (see testimony of Patty Kim, then Democratic candidate) 
(copy of transcript on file with author). 
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been upheld by the court in 2002. More specifically, the 2011 (House) Final 
Plan had population deviations within the historical range, complied with the 
federal Voting Rights Act, contained 14 fewer split municipalities than the 
2001 (House) Final Plan, and had more compact districts than those which 
passed muster in 2001.  
 Beyond a mere recitation of the plan’s parameters, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court agreed that the 2011 Final Plan was better than the 2001 effort. 
In the court’s February 3, 2012, Holt I opinion, Chief Justice Castille wrote, 
“[a]gain, we do not doubt that this Final Plan is an improvement over the 2001 
Final Plan.”96 Justice Saylor explained that, “[m]oreover, with regard to the 
2011 Final Plan, I agree with the majority that it is an improvement over the 
2001 plan . . . which surmounted the challenges raised in the appeals before 
this Court.”97 Justice Eakin concluded that “[t]he 2011 plan has fewer problems 
than the plan we found constitutional in Albert; it is not unconstitutional under 
existing precedent.”98  
 The 2011 Final Plan was constitutional based on all of the case law 
which existed prior to 2011. In Holt I, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court decided to invalidate the maps. 
 In the majority opinion in Holt I, Chief Justice Castille wrote that the 
“LRC’s [Commission’s] reliance on prior cases as creating an expectation that its 
Final Plan would be found constitutional, is untenable.”99 He further explained 
that a “prospective recalibration of certain of our precedents would be salutary 
and helpful in this unusual area of law . . . .”100 In fact, he went so far as to explain 
“our governing precedent in deciding these appeals has led us to conclude that it 
should be recalibrated to allow the LRC more flexibility in formulating plans, and 
particularly with respect to population deviation . . . Our prior precedent sounds 
in constitutional law; to the extent it is erroneous or unclear, or falls in tension 
with intervening developments, this Court has primary responsibility to address 
the circumstance.”101 
 In a footnote, and despite a fairly consistent theme over 40 years of 
jurisprudence since the 1967–1968 convention, the Chief Justice noted that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not “constrained to closely and blindly re-
affirm constitutional interpretations of prior decisions which have proven to be 
unworkable or badly reasoned.”102  
																																								 																				
96 Id. at 755. 
97 Id. at 762 (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted). 
98 Id. at 763 (Eakin, J., concurring and dissenting). 
99 Id. at 736. 
100 Id. at 758. 
101 Id. at 759. 
102 Id. at 759 n.38. 
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B. A Little More of This, A Little Less of That 
 
Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s pretensions of fundamental 
change, and 87 pages of discussion in the majority opinion, Holt I provided no 
real standards to guide the then-extant or future Legislative Reapportionment 
Commissions. Instead, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered this vague 
shift in direction away from population equality:  
  
First, and most simply, we reemphasize the importance 
of each of the mandates in Article II, Section 16. Contrary to the 
suggestion of the Court in In re 1991 Plan, Article II, Section 16 
by its terms does not “require that the overriding objective of 
reapportionment is equality of population.” . . . Rather, the 
Constitution lists multiple imperatives in redistricting, which 
must be balanced. . . .  
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to reaffirm the 
importance of the multiple commands in Article II, Section 16, 
which embrace contiguity, compactness, and the integrity of 
political subdivisions, no less than the command to create legis-
lative districts as nearly equal in population as “practicable.” 
Although we recognize the difficulty in balancing, we do not 
view the first three constitutional requirements as being at war, 
or in tension, with the fourth. To be sure, federal law remains, 
and that overlay still requires, as Reynolds taught, that equality 
of population is the “overriding objective.” But, as later cases 
from the High Court have made clear, that overriding objective 
does not require that reapportionment plans pursue the narrowest 
possible deviation, at the expense of other, legitimate state objec-
tives, such as are reflected in our charter of government . . . . 
We trust that our recalibration of the emphasis respecting 
population equality to afford greater flexibility in reapportioning 
legislative districts by population should create sufficient latitude 
that the 2011 LRC, and future such bodies, may avoid many of 
the complaints that citizens have raised over the years, 
particularly respecting compactness and divisions of political 
subdivisions. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, we do not direct a 
specific range for the deviation from population equality, or 
purport to pre-approve redistricting plans that fall within that 
range. Nor do we direct the LRC to develop a reapportionment 
plan that tests the outer limits of acceptable deviations.103  
																																								 																				
103 Id. at 759–61 (citations omitted).   
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck the map, ordered the Commission to 
sacrifice some portion of the democratic principle of representational equality on 
the altar of municipal boundary lines104 and told  the Commission to try again.  
 
C. Perpetuating Unconstitutional Lines (The Perfect as the Enemy of the 
Good, or at Least Better) 
 
Setting aside all of the precedent and accepting that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court wanted to “recalibrate” reapportionment objectives, the appro-
priate remedy would have been to make the changes prospective. Justice Eakin 
captured this concept in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Holt I when he 
said, “[w]hile I do not quarrel with the majority’s reordering of constitutional 
priorities, I do not find a need to make that reordering retroactive.”105     
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had at least two options concerning 
prospective application. Under the first option, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court could have simply established new, prospective rules for the 2021 
Legislative Reapportionment Commission.  
The second option involved allowing the 2012 election to be run on the 
new, more constitutional lines of the 2011 Final Plan and directing that a new 
plan be created in time for the 2014 elections. This was the process followed by 
the federal courts during the challenges to Congressional redistricting in 2002.106 
Pennsylvania voters were allowed better district lines while the General Assem-
bly went back to the drawing board.107 This was also the remedy for Pennsylvania 
voters in the 1964 state legislative elections. The Holt I opinion recognized:   
																																								 																				
104 While Holt I also raised questions regarding compactness, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court focused on “three particular Senate districts” and noted that these questions might be 
related to the overarching concern with split subdivisions. Id. at 757. 
105 Id. at 763 (Eakin, J., concurring and dissenting). 
106 See infra text accompanying note 107.  
107 These districts were from the line of Vieth cases, which culminated in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Leading up to that decision, the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania issued an order on Feb. 22, 2002, dismissing 
plaintiffs’ claims except for the one person-one vote claim. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 
2d 532, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2002). On April 8, 2002, the Middle District of Pennsylvania determined 
that Act 1 (Congressional reapportionment) violated one person-one vote and gave the General 
Assembly three weeks to craft a new plan. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (M.D. 
Pa. 2002). On April 18, 2002, Governor Schweiker signed Act 34 (replacing Act 1). 25 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 3595.301. “Defendants then petitioned the court to stay its decision regarding Act 1 and 
to allow the 2002 congressional elections to proceed under Act 1’s boundaries. Because primary 
elections were set to be held on May 21, 2002, the court agreed to stay its decision regarding Act 
1 in order to allow the primary election to take place as scheduled. Therefore, Act 34 was not in 
operation for the congressional elections that took place in November of 2002.” Vieth v. 
Pennsylvania, 241 F.Supp.2d 478, 480 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (emphasis added). 
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Time constraints precluded the Butcher I Court from fashioning 
any remedy with regard to the 1964 plan. The Butcher I Court’s 
solution was to direct that the 1964 elections proceed under the 
infirm legislation, retain jurisdiction, and direct the General Assem-
bly to correct course and devise a constitutionally valid plan for 
the 1966 election cycle no later than September 1, 1965.108  
 
In Holt I, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored both 
options. The reluctance of a federal court to intervene in this electoral process 
notwithstanding,109 the result of the Holt I Court’s order had a temporary, but 
significant, detrimental impact on two distinct components of the Common-
wealth’s electorate.   
The first portion of the population impacted were those citizens living in 
districts that were overpopulated under the old 2001 lines. Use of these old lines 
in the 2012 House elections perpetuated a population deviation that was wildly 
off-kilter. Under the 2001 lines, House District 24 remained a minus 19.7% 
(51,007 population) and House District 134 remained a plus 24.45% (77,873 
population). Therefore, the overall deviation in district population using the 2001 
House lines with 2010 population numbers was 44.15%. This compares to an 
overall deviation in the 2011 (House) Final Plan of 5.97%. The Supreme Court’s 
perpetuation of a 44.15% deviation was a far cry from “one person, one vote.” 
The second group of citizens directly affected by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s decision were Hispanics living in new Hispanic majority-
minority districts created by the 2011 (House) Final Plan. Pennsylvania is 
covered by Section 2 of the Federal Voting Rights Act.110 This federal statute 
was enacted to prohibit voting practices which interfered with equal access for 
minorities. The two new Hispanic majority-minority districts were delayed 
until the 2014 elections and this resulted in a federal lawsuit.111 
																																								 																				
108 Holt I, 38 A.3d at 744. 
109 “After the Holt I decision was filed, Senator Dominic Pileggi and Representative Michael 
Turzai—both members of the LRC by virtue of their positions as majority leaders of their 
respective caucuses—filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin this Court’s directive that 
existing districts should be used in the 2012 election cycle and until the Court approved a consti-
tutional reapportionment plan. In a February 8, 2011 order, the federal district court denied relief 
and concluded that the 2012 elections must proceed under the only existing map, the 2001 Plan.” 
Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt II), 67 A.3d 1211, 1216 (Pa. 2012). 
110 Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). 
111 Garcia v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 938 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D. Pa. 
2013), aff’d, 559 F. App’x 128 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing the complaint for failure to state a 
claim where plaintiffs alleged that under the 2001 Plan populations were malapportioned, 
and that Latino voting strength was unconstitutionally diluted). 
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V. THE 2012 (HOUSE) FINAL PLAN 
 
 As a result of the new general direction announced by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, the Legislative Reapportionment Commission went back to 
the drawing board. The Commission worked to reach agreement on the 2012 
Final Plan, which passed constitutional muster on May 8, 2013.112 
 Under Article II, § 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, both House and 
Senate maps are adopted in a single vote as one “reapportionment plan.” The 
authors of this Article were, as one would expect, more familiar and involved 
with House districts in the 2012 Final Plan. Importantly, there was agreement 
on the House districts between the Majority and Minority House Leaders on the 
2011 Final Plan, the 2012 Preliminary Plan and the 2012 Final Plan.  Therefore, 
the focus of the analysis which follows will exclusively be the House 
component of the overall reapportionment plan approved by the Court in Holt 
II,113 and will be based in large part on the authors’ own observations and 
corresponding conclusions. All calculations relating to population are based on 
United States Census data.    
 
A. Equality of Population and Seat Movement 
 
 From 2000 until 2010, the Commonwealth experienced a population 
growth of 3.43%.114 Further, excluding portions of Philadelphia, there had 
generally been a significant shift of the population center to the east. The growth 
and shift completely reconfigured the population of municipalities across the 
Commonwealth and influenced all of the districts in the 2012 (House) Final Plan.   
 Equality of population can be measured by either the deviation from 
the ideal district population or the deviation in population from the least 
populous district to the most populous district.115 Painting with a broad brush, 
																																								 																				
112 Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1242 (holding that the LRC “sufficiently heeded” the court’s ruling in 
Holt I and dismissing the appeals). 
113 Details of the 2012 (Senate) Final Plan are available at the Commission’s website. Senate 
Legislative Interactive District Map, PA. REDISTRICTING, http://www.redistricting.state. 
pa.us/Maps/Senate.cfm [https://perma.cc/4WDM-4U2A] (last accessed Feb. 12, 2019). 
114 Pennsylvania’s total population, as reported by the 2010 Census, was 12,702,379. Profile of 
General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010 Pennsylvania, U.S. BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DE 
C_10_DP_DPDP1&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/898V-7EWS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).  
115 See Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 989, 998–99 (Pa. 2002) 
(“The Commission cogently notes that the range of deviation from the ideal population, as well as 
the population ratio from the least populous to the most populous district, compares favorably to 
those in other plans found to be constitutional by this Court and the United States Supreme Court.”). 
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a population deviation of less than 10% in a state legislative reapportionment 
plan will generally pass muster under federal constitutional analysis.116   
 Given a total population of 12,702,379 and 203 House Districts, the 
target population for a legislative district in the 2011–2012 reapportionment 
was 62,573. Assuming an 8% deviation, 4% above and 4% below the target, 
the upper population number would be 65,076 and the lower population 
number would be 60,070. 
 Population equality could not have been achieved, however, without 
the movement of legislative seats from areas of population loss to areas of 
population growth. In this case, the movement of House seats in the 2012 
(House) Final Plan was driven by both population and the request of the House 
Democratic Leader to change seat movement from that endorsed by the 2011 
(House) Final Plan. It is noteworthy that seat movement was not one of the 
issues which arose in the Holt I Opinion.   
 In order to provide context to this discussion, below is a table which 
illustrates the population change from 2000 to 2010 in Republican House 
districts versus Democratic House districts.   
 
Categories Population Change 2000 – 2010 
All Republican House Districts 
(statewide) 
Gain of 463,340 
All Democratic House Districts 
(statewide) 
Loss of 42,015 
 
 The population change in all Democratic Districts (statewide) in the 10 
years preceding the 2011–2012 reapportionment had been a loss of 42,015. 
Under the 2011 (House) Preliminary Plan approved by the Commission, two 
Democratic seats were moving to two Democratic areas. After public input and 
comment, and with the endorsement of the House Democratic Leader, the 
2011(House) Final Plan moved a third Democratic seat to a Democratic area. 
 
																																								 																				
116 The U.S. Supreme Court has described a population deviation of 10% or less as meeting 
“prima facie constitutional validity;” however, this presumption is rebuttable with evidence 
that the deviation did not result from traditional redistricting criteria but from a systematic 
effort to underpopulate certain types of districts for partisan advantage. See Larios v. Cox, 
300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341–42 (N.D. Ga. 2004), summarily aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); see 
also Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (“[T]hose 
attacking a state-approved plan must show that it is more probable than not that a deviation 
of less than 10% reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors rather 
than the ‘legitimate considerations’ to which we have referred in Reynolds and later cases.”). 
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In the 2011 (House) Final Plan:  
• District 22, a Democratic district in Allegheny County, was moved to 
a Democratic area in Lehigh County. 
• District 45, a Democratic district in Allegheny County, was moved to 
a Democratic area in Chester County. 
• District 115, a Democratic district from Lackawanna and Wayne 
Counties, was moved to a Democratic area in Monroe County. 
 
 The population change in all Republican Districts (statewide) in the 10 
years preceding the 2011–2012 reapportionment had been a gain of 463,340.  
Nevertheless, under the 2011 (House) Final Plan, two Republican seats were 
moving to two Republican areas.  Republicans were relocating two of the five 
seats which were moving, even though the population gains in the state, in the 
aggregate, had been in Republican Districts.  
 
In the 2011 (House) Final Plan: 
• District 5, a Republican seat from Crawford and Erie Counties, was 
moved to a Republican area in Berks County. 
• District 169, a Republican seat from Philadelphia County, was moved 
to a Republican Area in York County. 
 
 To the casual observer looking solely at the statewide population shift, 
moving two Republican seats when the vast majority of population movement 
occurred in Democratic areas of the Commonwealth might not seem objectively 
fair to Republicans. Seat movement, however, is a product of both geography 
and the negotiated commission process. All seat movements in the 2011 (House) 
Final Plan were agreed to by both House Leaders.   
 
Moving the 74th District to Chester County (Geography, Population Loss and 
Negotiated Agreement): 
 In the 2012 (House) Final Plan, there was a change in seat movement from 
the 2011 (House) Final Plan at the request of the House Democratic Leader. Rather 
than move District 45 to Chester County, the Democratic Leader requested the 
movement of District 74 to a Democratic area in Chester County. This change 
reflected the retirement of Rep. Camille “Bud” George from Clearfield County. 
 Population numbers drove the decision to move the majority of seats from 
the west. The only regions of Pennsylvania to lose overall population in the 10 
years preceding the 2010 Census were the Northwest and Southwest. The greatest 
loss of population in Western districts117 occurred in districts held by Democrats. 
																																								 																				
117 Western seats are numbered 1–75, with the exception of seats 13 and 26 (Chester); 18, 29 and 31 
(Bucks); 37, 41 and 43 (Lancaster); 47 (York); 53, 61 and 70 (Montgomery); 68 (Bradford/Tioga). 
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Categories Population Change 2000 – 2010 
Western Republican House 
Districts 
Loss of 6,163 
Western Democratic House 
Districts 
Loss of 104,874 
  
 The aggregate Western numbers did not tell the whole story. When 
considering where the greatest population loss had occurred in the west, it 
became clear that the Southwest Democrats had experienced more aggregate 
population loss than Northwest Democrats. 
 
Categories Population Change 2000 – 2010 
Northwest118 Democratic House 
Districts 
Loss of 7,732 
Southwest119 Democratic House 
Districts 
Loss of 97,142 
 
 There were 28 Democratic districts in the Southwest and seven 
Democratic districts in the Northwest. Five of seven Northwest Democratic 
seats lost population. Twenty-six of twenty-eight Southwest Democratic seats 
lost population.  Therefore, it was also worth considering the loss of population 
in Democratic areas attendant to the Southwest. 
 Democratic districts in the Northwest, but bordering the Southwest, 
included Districts 9, 10 and 74. All of these districts lost population over the 
10-year period preceding the 2011–2012 reapportionment and ended up well 
below the minimum number to maintain an 8% overall deviation. As such, it 
was not unreasonable to consider changes to these districts in order to reflect 
population loss in Southwest Democratic districts.   
 Ten of eleven Northwest Republican seats lost population. Six of 
sixteen Southwest Republican seats gained population.   
 
Categories Population Change 2000 – 2010 
Northwest120 Republican House 
Districts 
Loss of 16,176 
Southwest121 Republican House 
Districts 
Gain of 10,013 
																																								 																				
118 Districts 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 74. 
119 Districts 16, 19 – 25, 27, 32–36, 38, 42, 45, 46, 48–52, 55, 58, 71–73. 
120 Districts 4, 5, 6, 8, 17, 63–67, 75. 
121 Districts 11, 12, 14, 15, 28, 30, 39, 40, 44, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 69. 
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 The overwhelming loss of population in all Western Pennsylvania 
districts (87.5%) occurred in districts held by Southwest Democrats.122 Aggre-
gate Republican losses in the Northwest were slightly higher than Northwest 
Democratic losses (8,444 more losses in Republican Districts); therefore, the 
Republicans moved a seat from the Northwest. Aggregate Democratic losses in 
the Southwest (97,142 total loss) had to be compared to Republican gains in the 
Southwest (10,013 total gain). The 2011 (House) Final Plan reflected these 
population numbers and moved two Democratic seats from Southwest 
Pennsylvania.  As noted above, this changed in the 2012 (House) Final Plan.   
 At the request of the House Democratic Leader, in part as a result of the 
announced retirement of Representative George from the 74th District, the 2012 
(House) Final Plan moved District 74 to a Democratic area in Chester County. 
At the time of the 2011–2012 reapportionment, the 74th lacked sufficient 
population for a legislative district.123 This was, therefore, a reasonable compro-
mise to address population loss in this area and others adjacent to it.   
 Since the change in seat movement was in response to the House Demo-
cratic Leader’s request, as well as reflective of population loss in District 74, the 
2012 (House) Final Plan minimized movement in Northwest districts with the 
obvious exception of District 74. Much of the migration and shift of House 
district boundaries to reflect this new seat movement occurred in Southwest 
Democrat districts. As part of the negotiated process, House Republicans did 
concede to some changes to several Republican districts in the area.  
 In the end, the 2012 (House) Final Plan had a deviation of 7.88%.124 It 
ranged from a minus 3.94% to a plus 3.94%. As the Holt II Court noted, there was 
“no population equality challenge” raised against the 2012 (House) Final Plan.125   
 
B. Compactness and Contiguity 
	
 As previously discussed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there 
is a certain degree of unavoidable non-compactness in any apportionment scheme. 
 While the Holt I Court cited Specter, it also explained that the “Court 
did not sanction abandonment of the compactness constitutional mandate in 
favor of a population equality absolute.”126 Therefore, the 2012 (House) Final 
																																								 																				
122 Total aggregate population loss in western districts was 111,037. Aggregate loss in 
districts held by southwestern Democrats was 97,142.  97,142 is 87.5% of 111,037. 
123 58,607. 
124 District 71 had a population of 65,036 (2,463 over target). District 21 had a population of 
60,110 (2,463 under target).  See 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMMISSION, 27 and n.73 (2014). 
125 Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt II), 67 A.3d 1211, 1239 (Pa. 2013). 
126 Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 758 (Pa. 2012). 
                                   Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [May 2019 
	
	
384 
Plan aimed to improve upon the overall compactness measurements of both 
the 2001 (House) Final Plan and the 2011 (House) Final Plan. 
 The average compactness of the 2001 (House) Final Plan was 25.348% 
(.25348) as measured by the Reock Test.127 The average compactness of the 
2011 (House) Final Plan, as measured by the Reock Test, improved to 25.407% 
(.25407). Finally, the average compactness of the 2012 (House) Final Plan 
improved again, as measured by the Reock Test, to 25.866% (.25866).   
 To comply with the requirement of contiguity, a person must be able to 
“go from any point within the district to any other point (within the district) 
without leaving the district.”128   
 Forty-seven municipalities in the Commonwealth had, at the time of 
the 2011–2012 reapportionment, precincts which were not physically con-
nected to the rest of the municipality.129 Those 47 municipalities were made up 
of 120 total “parcels,” including the main portion of the municipality. 
Subtracting the main portion of the municipality (the municipality itself) left 
73 of these noncontiguous parcels. They are geographic anomalies, i.e., part of 
the municipality but geographically disconnected from it. The creation and/or 
continuation of these geographic anomalies are the result of choices by the 
affected local governments and their residents. 
 These geographic anomalies had not caused a concern in prior 
reapportionments and were not mentioned in the Holt I opinion. Nevertheless, 
there was a concerted effort to eliminate these pre-existing non-contiguities as 
much as possible without increasing subdivision splits.  
 The 2011 (House) Final Plan had eight noncontiguous precincts which 
resulted in eight legislative districts with noncontiguous areas. The 2012 (House) 
																																								 																				
127  [T]he Reock Test . . .  first determines the two points on the district’s boundary 
that are farthest apart and calculates the area of a circle that would have the line 
between these two points as its diameter. The polygon area of the district is then 
divided by the area of that circle to produce a ratio between zero (0) and one (1). 
The closer the ratio is to one, the more compact the district. 
 
In re Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 198 (Colo. 1992) (citing Ernest C. Reock, 
Jr., Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. 
POL. SCI. 70 (1961). 
“Polygon area” is defined by the Commission as “[t]he sum of the areas of all census units 
(tracts and blocks) assigned to each district.” Id. at 198 n.14. 
128 Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 15, 23 (Pa. 1972) (citing Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1228, 1284 (1966)). 
129 This number was reported as 48 in Br. of Amicus Curiae for Michael Turzai as a Member of the 
2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission in Support of Respondent 2011 
Legislative Reapportionment Commission, n.22, Aug. 20, 2012. Upon further analysis, the actual 
number was determined to be 47. 
Vol. 4:3]      The Protection is in the Process 
	
	
385 
Final Plan had eight noncontiguous precincts130 which resulted in seven legis-
lative districts131 with noncontiguous areas.   
 A number of the legislative districts with noncontiguous areas in the 
2012 (House) Final Plan did not contain any population. The legislative districts 
with noncontiguous areas contained populations including Taylor Township in 
Lawrence County, Allentown in Lehigh County, and Lancaster Township and 
Mount Joy Township in Lancaster County. The total population in these 
noncontiguous precincts was 68 people.132 It is noteworthy that addressing non-
contiguity in some of these areas would have created additional municipal splits.    
 
C. Integrity of Political Subdivisions 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that a certain 
amount of subdivision fragmentation is unavoidable.133  As explained in the 
Albert case, some “fragmentation is inevitable since most political subdivisions 
will not have the ‘ideal’ population for a House or Senate district.”134   
 In Holt I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered both split 
subdivisions and “fractures” within those split subdivisions.135 This concept of 
“fractures” was roundly and correctly criticized by the Commission as an over 
count which artificially inflated the number of splits.136   
																																								 																				
130 Taylor, Mount Joy Cloverleaf, East Lampeter 8, Lancaster 8, Manheim 17 and 19, West 
Brunswick South, Cumru 1, Allentown 17-4 and Birmingham 2. 
131 Districts 10, 37, 43, 97, 124, 128 and 156.  Note, in the 2011 Final Plan: Districts 30, 99 
and 125 had noncontiguous areas, while district 156 did not have noncontiguous areas.      
132  The Commission Final Report in 2014 listed the total population of noncontiguous precincts as 
45. 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, supra note 124, at 29-30.  But, it seems the Final 
Report missed 23 people, including 2 people in block 2015 in Taylor Township, Lawrence County, 
and 21 people (10 in block 3017 and 11 in block 2037) in Lancaster Township, Lancaster County. 
133 “It should also be noted that under any scheme of reapportionment that aims at substantial 
equality of population, a certain amount of subdivision fragmentation is inevitable.” Specter, 293 
A.2d at 23. Accord In re 1991 Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 609 A.2d 132, 138 (Pa. 
1992) (noting that apportioning legislative districts requires “a certain degree of unavoidable non-
compactness and a certain amount of subdivision fragmentation [that] is inevitable”); In re Reappor-
tionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 666 (Pa. 1981) (citing Specter, 293 A.2d at 23).  
134 Albert, 790 A.2d at 993, citing Specter, 293 A.2d at 23. 
135 Holt I, 38 A.3d at 753–54, 755 n.37. 
136 See Holt II, 67 A.3d, at 1226. The Legislative Data Processing Center (LDPC) “Total Splits” 
calculation is based on the actual number of “splits” within a municipality. Each municipality 
across the Commonwealth is represented by at least one legislative district. If a municipality is 
represented by one district, there is no split. If a municipality is represented by two districts, there 
is one split. Three districts result in two splits, etc. Therefore, when counting “Total Splits” within 
any municipality, it is simply the number of legislative districts minus 1 (the original district). The 
Holt Appellants, based on the calculations in their brief challenging the 2011 Final Plan, counted 
the first (original) district in any municipality as a “split.”  Considering the 2011 Plan, LDPC 
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 Despite improvements over the 2001 Final Plan, the concern expressed 
was with the “raw number difference in subdivision splits.”137 While the 
Commission was not required to use any alternative proposed plan, the Holt I 
Court made clear that the overall numbers on splits needed to be reduced.138 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected “the invitation to set firm para-
meters” concerning an acceptable number of splits.139 
 
1. Split Subdivisions 
 
 To add some perspective to the discussion of splits, it is important to 
keep in mind that a number of municipalities and counties have to be split solely 
as a product of the math, i.e., they are larger than the maximum size of a legis-
lative district.    
 Pennsylvania has a total of 2,574 municipalities.140 Within Pennsylvania, 
there are seven municipalities that had to be split solely as a product of popula-
																																								 																				
calculated 108 split municipalities and 163 total splits.  Adding those together (108 + 163), the 
correct total is 271. The Holt Appellants’ calculation of “Total Municipal Splits” for the 2011 
Final Plan was 270.  Again, they were simply counting the districts, rather than the “splits.” Using 
this method of calculation, EVERY municipality in the Commonwealth would have at least one 
“split” because every municipality is represented by at least one legislative district. 
 
To reiterate: 
• LDPC Total Splits = The number of times a county, municipality or ward is “split” 
between legislative districts, e.g., two districts is one “split.” 
• Holt Fractures (Total Municipal Splits) = The number of legislative districts among 
which a county, municipality or ward is split, e.g., two districts is two “fractures,” one 
district is one “fracture.” 
 
The Holt I Court, assuming the Holt Appellants counted correctly, adopted this inflated “Total 
Municipal Splits” number and termed it “fractures.” Based on the information submitted at the 
Commission hearing on the 2012 Preliminary Plan and the subsequent court challenge, it appears 
this method of miscounting may have been discovered and corrected.  See Holt II, 67 A.3d, at 1218. 
137 Holt I, 38 A.3d, at 753–54. 
138 Id. at 754 n.35, 756–57. 
139 Id. at 757. 
140 2,574 was used for reapportionment purposes because it reflected the manner in which 
counties report municipal boundary lines to the Census. Municipalities which cross county bor-
ders are reported individually by each county.  For example, Cumberland County only reports to 
the Census that portion of Shippensburg which is located in the county and does not include the 
portion of Shippensburg which is in Franklin County. Therefore, the number of municipalities in 
a reapportionment context may be slightly higher than other sources. While the brief submitted 
by the Commission in support of the 2011 Final Plan used the number 2,563 (Commission Brief, 
p. 11), the Final Report of the Commission used 2,574.  Final Report, p. 21. The Pennsylvania 
State Data Center listed the number as 2,562 total municipalities. Pennsylvania State Data Center, 
Pennsylvania Facts 2014 (Penn State Harrisburg, 2014).   
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tion.141 This means that 2,567 municipalities could have been, if considered without 
reference to any other municipality, wholly contained within a legislative district.   
 The 2012 House Final Plan split only 61 of these 2,567 municipalities 
(2.37%).142 In other words, of the universe of municipalities that could be kept 
whole, only 2.37% were split in the 2012 (House) Final Plan.   
 Using an 8%143 deviation, 40 of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties (60%) had 
to be split solely as a product of population. Many of those had to be split 
multiple times. Only 10 of the remaining 27 counties (37%) were split in the 
2012 (House) Final Plan. In contrast, the 2011 (House) Final Plan split 12 of 
those 27 counties (44%).      
 The 2012 (House) Final Plan contained only one split county seat other 
than those county seats that were split as a result of population, i.e., county seats 
that had more population than a legislative district. Pottsville, in Schuylkill 
County, remained split.  Pottsville was not, however, a historically unified sub-
division.  It was split in both the 1980 and 2001 reapportionments. Pottsville 
Mayor John D.W. Reiley testified at the May 7, 2012, hearing of the Commission 
that the city was in favor of remaining split between the 123rd and 125th 
Legislative Districts.144 Further, four members of the Pottsville City Council sent 
a letter to the Commission explaining that the split between the 123rd and 125th 
Legislative Districts “has always worked well for Pottsville” and offered that city 
residents were “used to this structure, and like how it works.”145  
 Ostensibly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the 2011 House 
map because of split municipalities. Of the 2,567 municipalities that could be 
contained in a singular House seat (7 municipalities had to be split due to 
population), 101 were split in the 2011 House map. That is 3.93% of those 2,567 
municipalities. By comparison, there were 2,569 municipalities in 2001, 8 of 
																																								 																				
141 The seven municipalities are: Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Allentown, Erie, Reading, Upper 
Darby and Scranton. 
142 Sixty-eight split municipalities, but seven of those were split as a result of their 
population. See Br. of Amicus Curiae for Michael Turzai, supra note 129, at n.16. 
143 Or 7.88%. The smallest county which had to be split due to population was Carbon County 
with 65,249 people. The largest county which did not have to be split was Bradford County with 
62,622 people.   
144 “The city of Pottsville has had a rich history of effective representation from the 123rd and 
125th Legislative Districts. In addition to successful bipartisan cooperation, dual repre-
sentation has benefitted the city of Pottsville and the State of Pennsylvania . . . Promoting 
bipartisan and multi-municipal solutions to local problems has proven successful for 
Pottsville. Maintaining representation from the 123rd and 125th Districts should continue to 
be a model for effective governance.” (see testimony of Mayor Reiley, at 680-83).   
145 Letter from Mark Atkinson, Councilman, City of Pottsville, Pennsylvania, to Hon. 
Stephen J. McEwen, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (May 1, 2012) 
(on file with author). 
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which had to be split due to population, leaving 2,561 municipalities. In the 2001 
House map, which was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2002, 114 
of those 2,561 municipalities were split, which meant 4.45% of those 
municipalities were split. Thus so, there were less percentage splits in 2011 at 
3.93% which was overturned than in 2001 at 4.45% which was upheld. Even 
presuming the relevance of municipal splits when compared to equality of 
population as a factor, the authors contend that neither the 2001 nor the 2011 
municipal split percentage was close to being materially violative of any standard. 
 The 2012 Final House Plan demonstrated improvement over the 2011 
Final Plan (which was remanded) and the 2001 Final House Plan (which was 
approved) concerning split subdivisions. The numbers are in the table below.146   
  
2001 (House) 
Final Plan 
2011 (House) 
Final Plan 
2012 (House) 
Final Plan 
Split Wards 140 130 103 
Split Municipalities 122147 108 68 
Split Counties 49 52 50 
  
2. Total Splits 
 
 The 2012 (House) Final Plan also demonstrated improvement over the 
2011 (House) Final Plan and the 2001 (House) Final Plan concerning ward 
total splits, municipal total splits and county total splits. The Legislative Data 
Processing Center (LDPC) “Total Splits” calculation is based on the actual 
number of “splits” within a municipality. In other words, the “Total Splits” 
count is the number of times a ward, municipality or county is “split” between 
legislative districts.  The numbers are in the table below.148 
  
2001 (House) 
Final Plan 
2011 (House) 
Final Plan 
2012 (House) 
Final Plan 
Ward Total Splits 174 169 122 
Municipal Total 
Splits 
179149 163 115 
County Total Splits 219 232 221 
                                                             
146 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, supra note 124, at 23. 
147 While LDPC reports list this number as 122, the Commission Final Report in 2014 listed 
the number as 121. Id.  
148 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, supra note 124, at 23.  
149 While LDPC reports list this number as 179, the Commission Final Report filed in 2014 
listed the number as 178.  Id.  
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 The reduction in splits between the 2011 (House) Final Plan and the 
2012 (House) Final Plan was negotiated between the House Republican and 
Democratic Leaders. If the effort at crafting a revised reapportionment plan 
with bipartisan agreement was to succeed, fundamental fairness in changes had 
to be the order of the day. While House Republicans took a greater share of the 
burden on split reduction in the 2012 (House) Final Plan as compared to the 
agreed-to 2011 (House) Final Plan, it was deemed an acceptable result for a 
negotiated product.    
In its endorsement of the 2012 Final Plan, the Holt II Court offered: 
 
We agree with the. . . [Commission] that the number of splits, 
over and above those numbers which would be inevitable even in 
the absence of other constitutional factors, is remarkably small . . 
. . Moreover, respecting the point that it may be possible to 
produce maps with fewer subdivision splits, that circumstance 
alone proves little, since respect for the integrity of political 
subdivisions is but one of multiple state constitutional and federal 
commands that must be accommodated.150 
 
D. Voting Rights Act 
	
 Pennsylvania is covered by Section 2 of the Federal Voting Rights Act. 
As determined by the United States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,151 
the prerequisites to any challenge to a redistricting plan under Section 2 are:  
 
• a sufficiently large and geographically compact minority population, 
• that is politically cohesive, and 
• a majority voting bloc which would usually defeat the minority-
preferred candidate if the minority population were fragmented. 
 
 In short, a Section 2 question arises if a geographically compact minority 
group152 would consist of 50% or more of the voting age population in a potential 
legislative district.153 After the Gingles prongs are satisfied, the court will 
																																								 																				
150 Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1240. 
151 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986), made applicable to single-member districts by Growe v. Emison, 
507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993).  
152 In 2006, the United States Supreme Court stated that while no precise rule governs Section 2 
compactness, “inquiry should take into account ‘traditional districting principles such as maintaining 
communities of interest and traditional boundaries.’” League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433 (2006), quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997). 
153 Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993).  
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consider the totality of the circumstances154 to determine if a violation of the 
Voting Rights Act has occurred. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court 
recently clarified that a “strong basis in evidence” is necessary to pass strict 
scrutiny when a legislature employs race as the predominant factor in drawing a 
majority-minority district for Section 2 compliance.155 
 The 2012 (House) Final Plan observed traditional redistricting princi-
ples156 and the requirements of the Voting Rights Act to establish:  thirteen (13) 
Majority-Minority African-American Districts; three (3) Majority-Minority 
Hispanic Districts; three (3) Influence Districts with a combined African-
American and Hispanic voting age population of greater than 50%; and three (3) 
African-American Influence Districts.   
 
VI. A WORD ON ALTERNATIVE PLANS 
 
 Winston Churchill offered, “the maxim, ‘nothing prevails but perfec-
tion,’ may be spelled paralysis.” This observation is both accurate and applicable 
to the question of legislative reapportionment. As with Part V, much of the 
analysis which follows is based on the authors’ own unpublished analysis. 
 At the 1967-1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, Delegate 
Powell pointed out: 
																																								 																				
154 The “totality of the circumstances” includes, among other factors, the extent of historical 
discrimination in voting and in other areas, and the extent to which minorities have been able to 
elect their chosen candidates anyway. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–38, 44–45, 79–80.  In the 
legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the Senate enumerated 
several factors that might be relevant to an evaluation of challenges made under Section 2. These 
factors are, “(1) . . .  history of racial discrimination; (2) . . . racial vote polarization; (3) . . . (use 
of) voting practices or procedures that would increase the opportunity for discrimination; (4) 
whether minority group members had been denied access to a candidate slating process; (5) the 
extent to which minority group members suffered the effects of discrimination in other areas such 
as education, which (affected) . . . the political process; (6) whether political campaigns had been 
marked by racial appeals; and (7) the extent to which minority candidates had been elected . . . .” 
155 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1497 (2017) (quoting Alabama Legislative Black Caucus 
v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015)); see also Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of 
Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) (same as to VRA Section 5 compliance). 
156 Historically, the Commission’s methodology has been one in which the commission members 
examine the existing boundary lines for House and Senate members to do the following: 
Determine the areas in which population has changed over the course of the previous decade; 
move legislative seats when required given the changes in population; adjust existing lines to 
accommodate population shifts and equalize representation within acceptable deviations; split 
municipalities only when absolutely necessary; and, preserve the communities of interest 
represented by the cores of existing legislative districts. All of these “guideposts” in the LRC’s 
redistricting methodology are commanded by the State and Federal Constitutions or accepted 
redistricting practices implicitly authorized in the State Constitution and historical precedent.   
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The perfect reapportionment plan is impossible to draft. . . . It 
became obvious, upon actually working on an apportionment 
plan, that the final result, even in the best plan, will fall far short 
of perfection. This will be true regardless of the agency 
actually responsible for the drafting of the plan.  The greatest 
difficulty in drafting a good plan lies in the vast amount of 
information necessary for the . . . best possible districts.  
 
The population statistics are readily available, but use of these 
figures alone will not provide a good plan.  They will not indicate 
which wards of cities will best combine with adjoining suburbs.  
They will not indicate which . . . areas of adjacent counties have 
the greatest community of interest, or which areas within a 
county have worked and organized together.  
 
This information is available in only one existing govern-
mental body, the legislature. It is the only body in which the 
peculiar and diverse interests and characteristics of every 
area of the Commonwealth are represented.  It is, therefore, 
uniquely able to accumulate the information necessary for 
the preparation of a good plan.157  
 
 The use of the leaders of the majority and minority in each chamber was 
intended to serve both as an opportunity to harness the voices and statewide 
expertise of the entire General Assembly and as a check and balance.158 By 
forcing the representatives of diverse interests to work together in order to obtain 
a majority vote, the Commission system requires compromise.  
 As noted in the Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court on behalf of Commissioner Turzai in August 2012: 
																																								 																				
157 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 532 
(Feb. 7, 1968) (emphasis added) (providing that although Del. Powell was making this argument 
in favor of an amendment which would have allowed the entire legislature an opportunity to 
reapportion the Commonwealth and would only default to a Commission if the legislature could 
not accomplish the goal in 90 days, the principles he espoused are as applicable to the eventually 
adopted Proposal No. 2).  
158 See Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1223 (citation omitted) (describing a similar argument offered by the 
Commission in its defense of the 2012 Final Plan, “[c]iting to the same historical source, the LRC 
further notes the intention behind having partisan leaders from the General Assembly centrally 
involved in the reapportionment process: ‘The use of the partisan leaders of each [legislative] 
chamber was intended to serve both as an opportunity to harness the voices of all legislators of 
both parties through their leaders, and as a check and balance.’”). 
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Technology has allowed individuals incredible access to infor-
mation and the ability to process such information.  Anyone with 
a computer and the relevant census data can create his or her own 
reapportionment plan. In the instant series of cases, numerous 
Petitioners produced their own privately created reapportionment 
plans.  Some of these private plans attempted to reapportion the 
entire Commonwealth, while others were limited to localized 
challenges. . . . However, unvetted plans created by private 
citizens are not necessarily viable alternatives and should not be 
treated as such.159 
 
 Comparing those plans to a Commission-produced plan is, procedur-
ally speaking, an apples to oranges comparison. The Holt II decision 
specifically recognized that such plans, which have not been scrutinized in the 
same fashion as a Commission plan, should not be accorded the same value.160  
 Alternative plans are not produced through the legislative process and do 
not require the cooperation and compromise of Commissioners representing 
opposing political caucuses.161 These plans do not have the built-in checks and 
balances of the democratic process. They are neither subject to the notice and 
comment procedures created by the Pennsylvania Constitution, nor are they 
subject to the legislative process.162 They are computerized projections created 
in a vacuum without reference to the people they affect.163 
In this light, it is worth reviewing the efforts of some of the alternatives 
to the Commission process and product, both within the recent Pennsylvania 
experience and as against a national backdrop. 
																																								 																				
159 Br. of Amicus Curiae Michael Turzai, supra note 129,  at 4. 
160  Holt II, 67 A.3d. at 1230–31. 
161 See id. at 1224 (describing a similar argument offered by the Commission defending the 2012 
Final Plan, “[w]ith regard to alternative plans presented by various appellants, the LRC complains 
that these plans were not subject to public review or comment—they were completely unvetted.”). 
162 Those outside the Commission process can, and sometimes do, change plans on a whim 
without regard to public input, transparency, hearings or any of the other important 
milestones observed by the Commission. 
163 As is discussed in detail in the Commission’s defense of the 2012 Final Plan, each alternative 
plan appeared to have been created with the drafter’s own self-interested motives in mind. This can 
be seen by the fact that each plan drew the drafter’s area in the way most favorable to the drafter. 
The Holt plan reunited the township in which she lived while splitting the neighboring municipality. 
The Costa plan purported to be politically stronger for Costa appellants. The plans submitted by the 
Schiffer, Brown and Sabatina Petitioners did the same. Unlike the Commission, these drafters were 
not forced to defend the motives and biases of their plans. Holt II, 67 A.3d. at 1226–29 (discussing 
the Commission’s criticism of alternative plans) and at 1231 (“The LRC has engaged aspects of the 
various alternate plans, and in the process has made legitimate points in criticism.”). 
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A. No Perfect Plan 
	
 The Holt II Court explained that the Commission “has engaged aspects 
of the various alternate plans, and in the process has made legitimate points in 
criticism.”164 The lead appeals to the 2011 Final Plan and 2012 Final Plan were 
docketed as “Holt.”165 As this was the primary challenge levelled against the 
Commission’s plans, it is worth exploring just a few of the ways in which the 
Revised Holt Plan166 failed various communities of interest. 
 As an initial matter, the Revised Holt Plan used a methodology which 
completely discarded existing legislative and senatorial districts and started the 
process of reapportioning the Commonwealth from scratch. This “etch-a-sketch” 
method used in drawing legislative lines discards the communities of interest 
which historically shaped, and continue to impact, legislative districts. The 
Revised Holt Plan created “Potemkin Villages”167 based on the premise that only 
fewer splits of political subdivisions make for a sound reapportionment plan. 
 By her own admission, Amanda Holt (the initiator of the appeal which 
bears her name) set out to develop “an impartial and nonpartisan way to create 
districts that met the rules.”168 Therefore, the only considerations when drawing 
legislative districts, after removing the split in her own municipality and adding 
a split to the neighboring one, were equal representation within acceptable 
deviations and a basic understanding of the federal Voting Rights Act. As noted 
																																								 																				
164 Id. at 1231. 
165 “In the lead appeal docketed at 7 MM 2012 (‘Holt’), the appellants describe themselves as 
individual voters, registered Democrats and Republicans, hailing from Allegheny, Chester, 
Delaware, Lehigh, and Philadelphia Counties.” Holt I, 38 A.3d at 725.  “[A]s with the 2011 Final 
Plan litigation, the lead appeal in the instant matter, captioned Holt v. LRC and docketed at 133 
MM 2012, was filed by “voters in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who live in the Common-
wealth’s wards, municipalities, and counties the [2012 Final Plan] split, often multiple times, to 
form Senate and House of Representatives Districts [which the voters claim was] in violation of 
Article II, Section 16.” Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1217. 
166 Both the Holt I and Holt II opinions explained that the appropriate parameters of any appeal 
are tied to that which were available to the Commission.  “[W]e will not consider claims that were 
not raised before the LRC.”  Holt I, 38 A.3d at 733 (citation omitted).  “[W]e will not consider 
claims that were not raised before the LRC.”  Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1216 (citations omitted). 
167  An “impressive façade or show designed to hide an undesirable fact or condition” named after 
“Gregori Potemkin who supposedly built impressive fake villages along a route Catherine the 
Great was to travel.”  Potemkin Village, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Potemkin%20village [https://perma.cc/C7QL-MEVQ]. 
168 Amy McConnell Schaarsmith, Lehigh County woman helped upset proposed state reappor-
tionment map, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/st 
ate/2012/02/07/Lehigh-County-woman-helped-upset-proposed-state-reapportionment-map/ 
stories/201202070356 [https://perma.cc/UN4G-8CV6].  
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in the Holt II Petition for Review, Holt “created the Revised Holt Plan in essen-
tially the same manner that she created the Holt Plan addressed in the Court’s 
prior decision . . .”169  
 
1. How Coal and a River Shaped Two Legislative Districts  
 
Economic activity, and the culture which surrounds economic activity, 
often shapes the lives of those in and around it. These factors often create their 
own communities of interest. Regional pride and identity are often associated 
with specific economic activities.   
In one example, the areas which make up both the 2001-2012 and current 
107th Legislative Districts have focused, in large part, on the coal industry. The 
old (2001-2012) 107th contained 146 coal mining operations. The 107th under 
the approved 2012 (House) Final Plan contained 148 coal mining operations. 
Both figures were derived from comparing the information available at the 
Pennsylvania Spatial Data Access website,170 with the geographical boundaries 
of the former and current 107th Legislative districts. 
Additionally, the culture and identity of the 107th Legislative District 
has been, and will continue to be, shaped by this industry. The Anthracite 
Heritage Festival of the Arts in Shamokin celebrates the region’s association 
with coal. Whether visiting the Mining Museum in Knoebels Amusement 
Resort or viewing the remains of the Franklin Furnace, the area’s identity has 
been forged by this history. 
In contrast, the neighboring 108th Legislative District has historically 
been focused on the economic and cultural draw of the Susquehanna River. From 
the Sunbury River Festival to the world’s longest inflatable dam at the Shikel-
lamy State Park Marina, the 108th has always been, and continues to be, 
associated with the Susquehanna. 
Understanding these distinctions, the 2012 (House) Final Plan included 
only four coal mining operations in the current 108th Legislative District.  In 
contrast, the Revised Holt Plan moved the boundaries of the 108th to incorporate 
48171 coal mining operations and failed to honor the identity of communities of 
interest in this area. 
																																								 																				
169  Pet. for Review at 14, ¶ 39, Holt II. 
170 Pennsylvania Spatial Data Access (Originator, Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Protection), Coal Mining Operations, PENNSYLVANIA GEOSPATIAL DATA CLEARING-
HOUSE (July 2014), https://www.pasda.psu.edu/. 
171 In the 2012 (House) Final Plan, 43 of those 48 coal mining operations which the Holt 
revised plan would have moved to the 108th continue to reside in the 107th, maintaining the 
economic and cultural identity of the 107th. 
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2. School Districts 
 
The vast majority of legislative districts drawn in the 2012 (House) 
Final Plan contained substantial populations of the “old” district (the 2001 
Plan) in an effort to maintain a connection based on school districts. While 
school districts are not afforded the explicit constitutional protection enjoyed 
by counties, cities, incorporated towns, boroughs, townships and wards,172 they 
often form the backbone of the communities they serve. Taking the populations 
in each school district as they were in the 2001 House Plan and comparing 
them to both the Revised Holt Plan and the 2012 (House) Final Plan, the 2012 
(House) Final Plan did a substantially better job at maintaining these comm-
unities of interest in legislative districts. 
In the 2012 (House) Final Plan, only 13 legislative districts had more 
than 50% new school district population when compared to the 2001 lines (this 
included the 5 legislative districts that were moved due to population changes). 
Forty-two legislative districts under the 2012 (House) Final Plan contained 
between 25% and 50% new school district population; and the remaining 148 
legislative districts contained at least 75% commonality between the school 
populations of the old and new districts.   
The Revised Holt Plan, however, had 45 legislative districts that 
contained at least 50% new school district population. Seventy-one legislative 
districts contained between 25% and 50% new school district population when 
compared to the 2001 House Plan; and the remaining 87 contained at least 75% 
of the existing school district population.   
The average percentage of new school population in the 2012 (House) 
Final Plan was 18.72% while new school population in the Revised Holt Plan 
amounted to 32.83%. 
 
3. Seat Movement 
 
In every redistricting effort since the 1967-1968 Constitutional 
Convention, the most disruptive consequence of the process has been the 
movement of seats.173  Such movement not only deprives voters of the candidate 
of their choice, it also has a regional impact in that there may be fewer 
representatives advocating for a particular area of the Commonwealth. 
																																								 																				
172 See PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (indicating that “[u]nless absolutely necessary no county, city, 
incorporated town, borough, township or ward shall be divided in forming either a senatorial 
or representative district”).  
173 In the 1971 reapportionment, five House seats were moved. Eight House seats were 
moved in 1981. In 1991, six House seats were moved. 2001 saw four House seats moved.   
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As previously discussed, the process of House seat movement was 
negotiated between the Republican and Democratic Leaders of the House. 
Except for the purpose of accommodating the change in population over the last 
decade, the 2012 (House) Final Plan did not take away the voters’ “candidate of 
choice.” Much like the seat movement in the 2011 (House) Final Plan, all seat 
movement in the 2012 (House) Final Plan had a direct and substantial 
relationship to the losses and gains of population in the Commonwealth.   
The Revised Holt Plan moved a substantial number of seats away from 
the communities with which they had long been identified. For the purposes of 
this analysis, a legislative district was considered “completely moved” if the 
“new” district and the “old” district shared no population at all; and, a district 
was considered “substantially moved” if there would be less than 30% 
common population between the “old” and “new” districts.   
Under the Revised Holt Plan, nine legislative districts would have been 
completely moved; and, another fifteen seats would have been substantially 
moved from the communities with which they have been associated.174   
The movement of the legislative seats causes great consternation on the 
part of the electorate and the communities that are served by these legislative 
districts. For example, multiple news stories were published when one 
proposed plan included the movement of the 22nd Legislative District from 
Allegheny County to an area with population growth in the Eastern part of the 
state.175 Beyond the multitude of news stories, the proposed movement of the 
45th Senatorial District in Allegheny and Westmoreland Counties inspired legal 
challenges to the 2011 Final Plan by the Senate Minority Leader and (all) 
sitting Senate Democrats.176 One can only imagine the voter angst, and the 
number of appeals that would have been filed to the 2012 (House) Final Plan, 
had the Commission opted for a redistricting model that dislocated twenty-four 
House seats from the communities they serve. 
 
B. A Survey of States and the California Citizens Commission 
 
There are four categories of redistricting processes discussed in this 
section. They include states in which the legislative branch completes their 
state’s redistricting through the traditional legislative process; other states, like 
																																								 																				
174 The Holt Revised Plan completely moved the following House Districts: 5, 22, 37, 74, 
116, 154, 161, 169 and 197; and substantially moved 21, 31, 54, 73, 104, 115, 123, 124, 133, 
134, 138, 172, 174, 178 and 191.  
175 Tom Barnes, Legislative redistricting map angers Democrats, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2011/11/01/Legislative-
redistricting-map-angers-Democrats/stories/201111010256 [https://perma.cc/775X-EGCP]. 
176 Id.; Br. of Petitioners Senator Jay Costa, et.al, in Support of Petition for Review, Aug. 6, 2012. 
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Pennsylvania, that utilize a representative sample of the legislature (or their 
proxies) to accomplish this task (commonly referred to as a “hybrid” comm-
ission); one state that has adopted an effort to accomplish redistricting via a 
“nonpartisan citizens commission”; and, finally, a small group of states which 
do not fit within the other three methods of redistricting. 
Thirty-five states vest the authority to approve their state legislative 
districts in the legislature . . . .177 Six of those states provide for an “advisory” 
commission process of some type, where an appointed commission develops a 
redistricting plan and presents that plan to the legislature. 178 In these states, the 
legislature is vested with the authority to approve or disapprove the plan and 
some of these states provide for circumstances under which the legislature can 
amend the commission’s work product.179 Two of those states, Connecticut and 
Maine require a super-majority vote of the legislature.180 Five of those states 
provide for a default alternative (i.e. a “backup” commission process) in 
instances where the legislature fails to pass a plan.181  
Some sources have difficulty characterizing the Iowa process for 
redistricting.182  In Iowa, a non-partisan legislative staff is tasked with drawing 
state legislative redistricting plans.183 Given that the work product is internal to 
the legislature, voted upon by the members of the Iowa General Assembly and 
approved by the Governor, it is most like states in this first category than the 
other three described herein. 
Eleven states have adopted some form of a “hybrid” commission plan, 
similar to Pennsylvania, for redistricting of state house and senate seats. These 
																																								 																				
177 Those states include: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississ-
ippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and 
Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 30, 2019), http://www. 
brennancenter.org/analysis/who-draws-maps-states-redrawing-congressional-and-state-district-
lines [https://perma.cc/9AHC-K6L4]. See also Redistricting Commissions:  State Legislative Plans, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 21, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx [https://perma.cc/A46V-ABPT]. 
178 ME. CONST. art. IV, Pt 3, § 1-A; N.Y. LEGIS. LAW §§ 93-94 (McKinney); 2011 R.I. LAWS Ch. 
106, § 1, 2011 R.I. LAWS Ch. 100, § 1; VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 34A, § 1904; VA. Executive Order 
No. 31 (2011). 
179 Id.  
180 CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6a; ME. CONST. art IV, Pt. 3, § 1-A. 
181 CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6b; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MISS. CONST., § 254; OKLA. CONST. 
art. V, § 11A; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28. 
182 Redistricting Commissions, supra note 177.  
183 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 42.2 -42.3. 
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states include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, 
Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington.184 For purposes of this review, 
a “hybrid model” is one in which the legislative leaders serve on the 
commission directly or appoint members to serve on their behalf. The 
legislative, or legislatively appointed, commissioners typically make up the 
majority of the commission;185 who then appoint one or more additional 
members, one of whom typically serves as chair.   
Among those that provide for legislatively appointed, non-legislator 
commission members, states typically prohibit persons who are public officials 
from serving and some states provide that commission members be selected 
from varying geographical areas.186 Most states which provide for legislatively 
appointed members, however, do not otherwise limit the pool of potential 
appointees in any meaningful way. Though vested with the authority to 
approve plans, two states require their commissions to submit plans to the 
legislature.187 In Washington, a plan may be amended by the legislature if two-
thirds of each house approves.188 In Montana, the legislature returns its 
recommendations to the commission which then produces final maps.189 
 There are those that may argue that, because the commission members 
are non-legislators appointed by legislative leaders, the states of Alaska, 
Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Washington should be considered “independent 
commissions” akin to California, detailed below.190 For purposes of this 
Article, these states are categorized here as using a “hybrid” method because 
the appointees arrive at their position by virtue of their party registration and 
their selection by a legislative leader. These five states effectively adopted a 
“hybrid commission by proxy” method of redistricting. 
																																								 																				
184 ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2 § 1; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; COLO. 
CONST. art. V, § 48; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; ME. CONST. art. 
IV, Pt. 3, § 1-A; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; OHIO. CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST. art. II, 
§ 17; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43. 
185 Alaska is included in this group; however, the legislatively appointed commissioners 
make up two of the five members (which also includes two gubernatorial appointees and one 
for the state’s Chief Justice).  ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 8. 
186 Arizona’s law, created by ballot initiative in 2000, limits possible appointees from which 
legislative leaders could choose 10 Republicans, 10 Democrats and 5 persons not registered 
with either party, who are nominated by the state’s commission on appellate court 
appointments.  ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2 § 1. 
187 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(4). 
188 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7).   
189 MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(4). 
190 Justin Levitt & Jeff Wice, All About Redistricting, LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL, http://re 
districting.lls.edu/who.php [https://perma.cc/P486-7J2J] (2016). 
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 Three states are difficult to categorize as using a “hybrid” commission 
method for redistricting. In Missouri and New Jersey, the state political parties 
appoint members to serve on their redistricting commissions.191 New Jersey’s 
commission, for example, consists of ten members appointed from two 
political parties.192 If the ten members are unable to certify establishment and 
apportionment, then the state Supreme Court Chief Justice appoints an eleventh 
member to the Commission.193  In Arkansas, the Governor, Attorney General 
and Secretary of State draw legislative districts.194  
 Finally, in 2008, California adopted a 14-person, “nonpartisan citizens 
commission” process. Eight citizens are selected at random from a pool of 20 
Democrats, 20 Republicans and 20 electors of other parties.195 Those eight then 
select six members from the remaining pool of voters from other parties.196 The 
majority and minority leaders of the California House and Senate are 
empowered to eliminate two nominees from each of the three pools of 
voters.197 In the end, the commission consists of five Democrats, five 
Republicans and four electors who are from other parties.198 
 Proponents of citizens commissions typically point to two basic argu-
ments for states to abandon their current process of redistricting in favor of this 
process. First, proponents argue that California’s process ensures against gerry-
mandering. Second, a citizens commission would establish legislative districts 
that would be substantially more competitive than those established under either 
the legislative or hybrid method of redistricting. The nation’s only true example 
of a citizens commission, however, indicates that neither goal was realized.  
 The use of a citizens commission in California demonstrates that even 
the most nonpartisan process199 is susceptible to undue influence specifically 
because such commissions do not have the longstanding, statewide perspective 
available to a legislative body such as the Commonwealth’s General Assembly.   
 An article on ProPublica’s website, entitled “How Democrats Fooled 
California’s Redistricting Commission,”200 outlines the problems. Reviewing e-
																																								 																				
191 MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, ¶ 1–2; 17 V.S.A. § 1904. 
192 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, ¶ 1. 
193 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, ¶ 2. 
194 ARK. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
195 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2. 
196 Cal. Gov’t Code § 8252(g). 
197 Id. at § 8252(e). 
198 Id. at § 8252(e)-(g). 
199 The irony of portraying a process as nonpartisan when a commission’s makeup is entirely 
dependent upon political affiliation (five Democrats, five Republicans and four others) 
should not be lost on the reader. 
200 Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistricting 
Commission, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-demo 
crats-fooled-californias-redistricting-commission [https://perma.cc/V6SW-9N7D]. 
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mail correspondence and internal memos, as well as interviewing participants in 
California’s redistricting process, the article describes a concerted, and 
successful, effort by California Democrats to directly influence the work of the 
Commission.  Several quotes from this article describe this effort: 
 
[I]n 2010, California voters put redistricting in the hands of a 
citizens’ commission where decisions would be guided by public 
testimony and open debate. . . . 
 
The citizens’ commission had pledged to create districts based 
on testimony from the communities themselves, not from parties 
or statewide political players. To get around that, Democrats 
surreptitiously enlisted local voters, elected officials, labor 
unions and community groups to testify in support of 
configurations that coincided with the party’s interests.  
 
When they appeared before the commission, those groups 
identified themselves as ordinary Californians and did not 
disclose their ties to the party. One woman who purported to 
represent the Asian community of the San Gabriel Valley was 
actually a lobbyist who grew up in rural Idaho, and lives in 
Sacramento. 
  
In one instance, party operatives invented a local group to 
advocate for the Democrats’ map. . . .201 
 
This resulted in a gerrymandered map which did not reflect population growth 
in Republican areas.   
 As noted by the delegates who participated in the 1967-1968 
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, legislators know the communities of 
interest all across the state and can apply that knowledge to the redistricting 
process. A citizens commission, attempting to acquire that knowledge in a very 
short period, is at a substantial disadvantage. As evidenced in California, this 
inexperience can be detrimental to the voters and can result in significant and 
severe gerrymanders.  
 As to the question of whether the California citizens commission 
created more competitive districts, the answer appears to be, “no.” According 
to the nonpartisan, non-profit organization FairVote, the citizen’s commission 
in California did result in an “unusually high degree of incumbency turnover 
																																								 																				
201 Id. 
Vol. 4:3]      The Protection is in the Process 
	
	
401 
in 2012.”202 Most commentators take note of the 2011 election cycle when 
arguing in support of the California model.203 However, FairVote’s analysis 
revealed that, beyond displacing certain incumbents in the first election cycle 
after the new districts took effect, “the overall competitiveness of the state’s 
map has not increased.”204   
 The organization went on to explain: 
 
In fact, there were exactly as many competitive districts (that is, 
districts that voted within 3% of the presidential candidates’ 
national margins) in 2012 as there were in 2008: 5. There were 
also just as many safe districts (which voted at least 10% more 
for one candidate than did the nation as a whole) in both 
elections.205 
 
 While the organization was unable to control for shifting voter 
preferences in their study, the data suggests that the “Citizens Redistricting 
Commission had no effect on district competitiveness whatsoever. . . .”206 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The nature of drawing lines, making distinctions or making changes to 
the settled order is that someone is always going to be upset with the result. 
This truth underlies any effort at reapportionment.  There is no perfect answer. 
There is no reapportionment plan which, when viewed through the jeweler’s 
eye, is not weighed, measured, and found wanting in some way.   
																																								 																				
202 See Did the California Citizens Redistricting Commission Really Create More Competitive 
Districts?, FAIRVOTE (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.fairvote.org/did-the-california-citizens-
redistricting-commission-really-create-more-competitive-districts [https://perma.cc/EG2C-M 
FJ2] (explaining that five incumbents were defeated in the 2012 general election while another 
nine members of the general assembly chose not to run). 
203  See Steve Westly, Washington Should Follow California’s Lead on Political Reform, 
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-west 
ly/washington-should-follow-california_b_4269611.html [https://perma.cc/998B-PCYS] (ar-
guing that the rest of the nation should follow California’s lead in its redistricting model); see 
also Kim Soffen, Independently Drawn Districts Have Proved to Be More Competitive, NEW 
YORK TIMES (July 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/upshot/independently-drawn-
districts-have-proved-to-be-more-competitive.html [https://perma.cc/SN3S-JX4G] (comparing 
Arizona and California’s redistricting initiatives). 
204 Did the California Citizens Redistricting Commission Really Create More Competitive 
Districts?, supra note 202. 
205  Id. 
206  Id. 
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 As noted in the Commission brief and recognized in the Holt II opinion, 
the “other” plans which levelled challenges at the 2012 Final Plan were all 
subject to legitimate criticism. Each focused on one particular interest or one 
particular community, whether it was the self-serving plan put forward by one 
Caucus of the General Assembly or the Holt plan motivated by the desire to put 
one township back together at the expense of a neighboring municipality. Each 
started with the premise of benefitting a particular subset of the Commonwealth.   
 The Commission, as a democratic institution, has proven time and 
again that it is particularly suited to comprehend all of the various communities 
of interest across the Commonwealth. In concert with the explicit standards of 
Article II, § 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, it is the Commission process 
in § 17 which protects us all. 
	
 
